SOLOVE.DOC

07/07/04 1:38 PM

THE VIRTUES OF KNOWING LESS:
JUSTIFYING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
AGAINST DISCLOSURE
DANIEL J. SOLOVE†
ABSTRACT
This Article develops justifications for protections against the
disclosure of private information. An extensive body of scholarship
has attacked such protections as anathema to the Information Age,
where the free flow of information is championed as a fundamental
value. This Article responds to two general critiques of disclosure
protections: (1) that they inhibit freedom of speech, and (2) that they
restrict information useful for judging others.
Regarding the free speech critique, the Article argues that not all
speech is of equal value; speech of private concern is less valuable
than speech of public concern. The difficulty, however, is
distinguishing between public and private concerns. Traditional
approaches include deferring to the media, distinguishing between
public and private figures, and looking to the nature of the
information disclosed. However, these approaches are flawed.
Instead, we should focus on the relationships in which information is
transferred and the uses to which information is put. The propriety of
disclosures depends upon their purpose, not merely on the type of
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information disclosed. The Article analogizes to the law of evidence,
in which certain information is admissible for some purposes but not
others and then examines the values of free speech and argues that
privacy often furthers the same ends, demonstrating that free speech
should not always prevail in the balance.
Next, the Article tackles the judgment and trust critique, which
views personal information as essential for making judgments about
whether to trust people with whom one associates. Although personal
information can help facilitate judgments about other people, the
Article contends that these judgments are often made quickly and out
of context. In short, more information does not necessarily lead to
more accurate judgments. The Article also contends that privacy
protects against certain rational judgments that society may want to
prohibit (such as employment decisions based on genetic
information). The Article then responds to commentators who argue
that gossip is valuable because it helps educate us about human nature
and argues that the value of concealing one’s past can, in many
circumstances, outweigh the benefits of disclosure.
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[Y]ou can't keep out the light of the Press. Now what I’m going to
do is to set up the biggest lamp yet made and to make it shine all
over the place. We’ll see who’s private then!
1

— Henry James, The Reverberator (1888)

INTRODUCTION
When is it justifiable for the law to prohibit the disclosure of
another person’s private information? This question has long
confounded courts and troubled scholars. The question is especially
perplexing in today’s Information Age, when the free flow of
information is championed as a fundamental value. Of course, people
conceal private information everyday, and relatively few would
contend that it should be impermissible to keep certain personal
information hidden. But should the law help people conceal
information?
Today, the ease of disseminating personal information is
unprecedented. The media has grown hungrier for stories, which are
needed to fill the vast array of news shows, the growing number of
twenty-four-hour cable news networks, and the tens of thousands of
magazines, newspapers, and websites. Without warning, anyone can
broadcast another’s unguarded moments or times of youthful
awkwardness to an audience of millions. In addition, companies that
archive Internet data ensure that embarrassing material follows a
victim for life, while Google and other search engines provide
instantaneous access to a wealth of personal information. More and
more people are keeping “blogs” (short for “web logs”), where they
2
post their thoughts and pictures on the Internet. Blogs can reveal
intimate details about friends, enemies, jilted lovers, and others. To
give one example, an awkward and overweight fifteen-year-old kid

1. HENRY JAMES, THE REVERBERATOR 68 (1888).
2. See Warren St. John, Dating a Blogger, Reading All About It, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2003, § 9, at 1 (“[B]logging [is] a once marginal activity of Internet enthusiasts that has become
squarely mainstream.”).
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recorded a short video cassette of himself and pretended to be a
character from the movie Star Wars: Episode IThe Phantom
3
Menace. He danced around with a golf ball retriever pretending it
was a light saber, making his own sound effects. Somebody found the
video, converted it to digital format, and posted it on the Internet,
where it was then downloaded millions of times across the globe. One
blogger even created a version of the video with special effects and
music. Websites were barraged by postings making fun of the kid.
“People were laughing at me,” the kid wrote, “[a]nd it was not funny
at all.”4
Beyond disclosure by the media and on websites, increasingly
personal information is being traded among companies, which
5
maintain extensive dossiers about millions of individuals. These
dossiers are stored and transferred in vast databases, and they contain
details about people’s race, hobbies, income, finances, family life,
purchases, and lifestyle.6 Credit reporting agencies routinely disclose
personal information when advising creditors about a person’s
7
creditworthiness. This data affects people’s lives in profound ways—
determining whether they get a loan, a job, a mortgage, or a license.
Given the development of technologies that permit extensive
data gathering and dissemination, deciding how to regulate the
disclosure of personal information is a vital issue. Currently, a
significant body of law, comprised of both common law and statutes,
restricts the disclosure of personal information. Within this legal
framework, the most controversial and frequently debated protection
against disclosure is tort law’s prohibition against public disclosure of
private facts. The tort of public disclosure originates from an 1890
article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
in which they argued that the “press is overstepping in every direction
8
the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.” They complained
3. Amy Harmon, Fame is No Laughing Matter for the “Star Wars Kid,” N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2003, at C3.
4. Id.
5. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403–13 (2001) (describing a variety of data
collection, storage, and vending techniques).
6. Id. at 1406, 1409–11.
7. See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1245 (2003) (“[C]reditors rely upon credit reporting agencies to obtain
information about a person’s credit history.”).
8. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890).
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that the press had “invaded the sacred precincts of private and
9
domestic life” and that gossip had become “a trade.” Today, the vast
majority of states have created tort actions in response to the Warren
10
and Brandeis article. Under the public disclosure tort, a person has a
cause of action when another widely discloses a private matter that is
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate
concern to the public.”11 This tort remains one of the most fascinating
puzzles of tort law. It enables people to sue others for disclosing true
information about them, even if the information was obtained
through lawful means.
In addition to the tort of public disclosure, the common law
provides a number of other protections against the disclosure of
personal information. For example, a tort for breach of confidentiality
remedies disclosures of medical information by physicians and
12
financial data by banks. Liability under this tort even extends to
third parties who induce the disclosure.13
On the statutory side of the law, there is a panoply of federal and
state statutes that limit disclosures of personal data. A number of
federal statutes restrict disclosure of information from school

9. Id.
10. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (noting that
Minnesota was one of the few states that had not recognized the privacy torts, but reversing
course and embracing the torts). The only states not recognizing any of the privacy torts are
North Dakota and Wyoming. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL
LIABILITY 77 (2001). The recognition of tort actions to protect privacy began in the early
twentieth century. New York enacted a statute to protect privacy in 1903. Act of April 6, 1903,
ch. 132, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308, 308 (codified as amended at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51
(McKinney 1992)). The law was passed in response to a 1902 New York Court of Appeals
decision rejecting a common law basis for the Warren and Brandeis privacy tort. Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902). In 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court
recognized a common law tort for privacy invasions. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50
S.E. 68, 80–81 (Ga. 1905). In 1960, tort scholar William Prosser identified four distinct privacy
torts that had developed through the 300 cases based on the Warren and Brandeis article.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 388–89 (1960). The torts are (1) public
disclosure of private facts, (2) intrusion upon seclusion, (3) false light, and (4) appropriation. Id.
at 389.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
12. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (finding a breach of
confidentiality tort for disclosure by bank); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 439 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1997) (finding a breach of confidentiality tort for disclosure by a physician). For more
information on the breach of confidentiality tort, see generally Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of
Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982).
13. Hammonds v. AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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14
15
16
records, cable company records, video rental records, motor
17
18
vehicle records, and health records. Specifically, the Fair Credit
19
Reporting Act restricts the permissible uses of credit reports and
regulates the disclosures that credit reporting agencies can make.20
Various states have also restricted the disclosure of particular forms
21
22
of information, such as data about health, alcohol and drug abuse,
sexual offense victims,23 HIV status,24 abortion patients,25 and mental
illness.26
However, protections against the disclosure of true information
often conflict with important values: freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, an employer’s ability to know more about employees, and
more complete knowledge of the people we deal with. Prodisclosure
arguments have gained a lot of currency in legal scholarship and

14. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
15. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 631, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
16. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–11 (2000).
17. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–25 (2000).
18. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3) (2000).
20. For example, for certain transactions, the FCRA prohibits the reporting of
bankruptcies over ten years old and criminal records over seven years old. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a).
21. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120,975 (West 1996) (prohibiting disclosure
of HIV test results); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (McKinney 2002) (prohibiting the
nonconsensual disclosure of medical records of minors relating to sexually transmitted diseases
and abortion; even the disclosure to parents is prohibited without consent).
22. See, e.g., 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1690.108 (West 1990) (prohibiting the disclosure
of all records prepared during alcohol or drug abuse treatment).
23. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 352.1 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54−86d to
−86e (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 97D (West 2003). For a more
comprehensive list of statutes, see Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort:
An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 433 n.40 (1996).
24. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.20−.21; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004
(West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5133 (West 2001); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782
(McKinney 2001). For a more comprehensive list of statutes, see Mintz, supra note 23, at 433–34
n.41.
25. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0112; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015. For a more comprehensive list of statutes, see Mintz, supra note
23, at 434 n.42.
26. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-120 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-451;
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19, § 16; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.3 (West 1997). For a more
comprehensive list of statutes, see Mintz, supra note 23, at 434 n.44.
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27
public policy. For example, Harry Kalven argues that the public
disclosure tort is a failure and should be abolished.28 Diane
Zimmerman contends that privacy is outweighed by society’s
“powerful countervailing interest in exchanges of accurate
information about the private lives and characters of its citizenry.”29
Richard Posner and Richard Epstein contend that the law should not
protect against disclosures of discreditable information, since this
information is useful to others in judging people, and concealment is
tantamount to fraud.30 Solveig Singleton argues that “[t]hroughout
history, people have generally been free to learn about one another in
the course of business transactions and other day-to-day contracts.
Restrictions that alter this default rule sweep a potentially enormous
pool of facts and ideas out of the shared domain.”31 Finally, Eugene
Volokh has engaged in one of the most extensive attacks on
disclosure protections, arguing that they are incompatible with
freedom of speech.32
Privacy appears to conflict with the general mantra of the
Information Age—that information should roam free. Disclosure
protections, critics charge, promote a culture of secrecy rather than
one of openness. Privacy impedes discourse, impairs autonomy in
communication, and prevents accountability for one’s conduct. Many
people want to know if their neighbors are sex offenders, if their
babysitters have a criminal past, if their sexual partners have a
sexually transmitted disease, and if their spouses are being unfaithful.

27. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890–1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1172–73 (1992) (arguing that privacy’s “vindication
through the common law privacy tort . . . has proven ineffective. . . . [and] has become an
anachronism”); John H. Fuson, Note, Protecting the Press from Privacy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 629,
637 (1999) (“[I]t is impossible to draw a universal line in the sand . . . that protects privacy
entirely without unduly compromising other social values.”).
28. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (Spring 1966).
29. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 341 (1983).
30. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 46, 660–63 (1998); see Richard A.
Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74
B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (“[W]hen a major change in personal or financial status is
contemplated by another party, the white lies that make human interaction possible turn into
frauds of a somewhat deeper dye.”).
31. Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 152 (2000).
32. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1090,
1095 (2000).
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Thus, privacy protections against disclosure, when analyzed in light of
our longstanding tradition of protecting free speech and a free press,
seem quite problematic.
Why should the law limit disclosures of true information,
especially information people find interesting, entertaining, or
important for understanding and judging other people? In this
Article, I justify why the law should protect against disclosures of
private information. Thus far, few commentators have attempted a
thorough defense of protections against disclosure. In certain
33
contexts, such protections have been defended, but much work
remains to justify these protections systemically. Justifying privacy
protections is difficult because in countless situations disclosures
should be permitted. How can one determine which disclosures to
restrict and which to permit?
The justifications for the law’s intervention are nuanced and
complex, but they are worth exploring. In a world of unprecedented
information dissemination, with a staggering array of types of media
and a profound number of media entities, the issue of why the law
should protect against the disclosure of personal information is of
paramount importance.
In this Article, Parts I and II develop a justification for
protections against disclosure by engaging the central critiques of
such protections. I classify the criticisms into two groups, which I label
(1) “the free speech critique,” and (2) “the judgment and
trust critique.”
33. Paul Schwartz has been the most notable defender of disclosure protections. Schwartz
has defended protections against the disclosure of health and genetic information to employers
and insurers. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care
Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (1997) (“[G]enetic information may cause certain members
of society to be transformed into a ‘biological underclass.”). Schwartz’s article is a profound
contribution to the debate, but his focus is narrow and he does not address the free speech
critique. Schwartz has also defended the Fair Information Practices against Eugene Volokh’s
critique. Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1560–64 (2000). The Fair Information
Practices are a set of principles for the regulation of data originally proposed in the United
States in 1973 and later developed internationally by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development in 1980. Schwartz’s main argument is that the Fair Information
Practices are not simply restrictions on the disclosure of personal data, but are rules that govern
the access, use, and accuracy of information. Id. at 1561–62. Robert Post has also offered a very
important and influential defense of the public disclosure tort, justifying it as promoting rules of
civility. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989) (“[T]he tort . . . safeguards rules of civility
that in some significant measure constitute both individuals and community.”). However, his
article does not address the free speech critique.
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Part I discusses the free speech critique. According to this
argument, protections against the disclosure of true personal
information interfere with the First Amendment right to free speech.
I argue that the existing free speech doctrine already contains the
seeds for a viable approach toward permitting privacy protections.
Privacy interests often do not conflict with the reasons for which
society values free speech. In fact, privacy may serve these ends as
well as or even better than does free speech. I conclude that speech of
private concern is less valuable than speech of public concern and
should be assigned less weight when being balanced against privacy
protections.
The great difficulty, however, is determining how the law should
distinguish between speech of public and private concern. Existing
approaches include (1) deferring to the media, (2) looking to the
status of the individual involved (e.g., whether the subject of the
disclosure is a public or private figure), or (3) focusing on the nature
of the information (e.g., whether it relates to public matters such as
politics, or private matters such as health and sex). These prevailing
approaches view disclosure in a black-and-white fashion: either
information is of public concern and can be disclosed for any purpose,
or it is of private concern and should be kept secret.
I argue that the prevailing approaches are deeply flawed. In view
of this criticism, what is the best way to distinguish between private
and public concerns? I suggest that the answer lies in an unlikely
source—the law of evidence, which has much to teach the law of
privacy. I do not refer to evidence law in its particulars, although I use
some specific examples. Rather, I draw from some of evidence law’s
more general concepts—the way that it manages information. The
law of evidence assesses the admissibility of information contextually
rather than in the abstract. Evidence law links information to the
context in which it is gathered and disseminated, and it looks to the
purpose or the use of the data. Therefore, I argue that assessing
whether a disclosure is of public or private concern should focus on
the relationships in which information is transferred and the uses to
which the information is put.
Part II focuses on a second group of criticisms—the judgment
and trust critique. The judgment and trust critique views the free flow
of personal information as valuable because it enables people to
assess the reputation of others and to make important judgments
about those with whom they associate. To the extent that disclosures
do not involve people with whom one ordinarily interacts, these
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disclosures can provide insight into human nature and information
about other people’s lifestyles and attitudes. However, I argue that
more information about people’s private lives does not necessarily
improve one’s judgment about them. In fact, it may foster distorted
and irrational judgments. Even some rational judgments about people
are outweighed by privacy. As for aiding judgments about human
nature, only certain forms of disclosure have an educative function.
Additionally, I demonstrate how the harms of many disclosures can
be avoided without sacrificing their benefits.
By engaging these critiques of privacy protections, I justify the
law’s safeguards against disclosures of personal information. Even in
the current age, when information is king, sometimes less access to
information is the soundest policy choice.
I. THE FREE SPEECH CRITIQUE
Protections against disclosure often come into conflict with the
First Amendment right to free speech. The First Amendment
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
34
of speech, or of the press.” The free speech critique contends that
freedom of speech trumps privacy. As Thomas Emerson argues:
“Any individual living among others is, by the very nature of society,
subject to an enormous amount of comment, gossip, criticism and the
like. His right to be left alone does not include any general right not
to be talked about.”35 Similarly, Eugene Volokh contends: “The
difficulty is that the right to information privacy—my right to control
your communication of personally identifiable information about
me—is a right to have the government stop you from speaking about
36
me.” Volokh concludes that the First Amendment “generally bars
the government from controlling the communication of information,”
and that “[w]hile privacy protection secured by contract is
constitutionally sound, broader information privacy rules are not
easily defensible under existing free speech law.”37 Can disclosure
protections be reconciled with the First Amendment?
In this Part, I argue that a workable balance between privacy and
the First Amendment can be reached. The free speech critique is
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 556 (1970).
36. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1050–51.
37. Id.; see also Singleton, supra note 31, at 132–52 (surveying the issues that may arise
from the conflict between privacy regulation and the First Amendment).
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quite formidable, and it cannot be readily dismissed. In the end,
disclosure restrictions can withstand the critique, but it is a qualified
and nuanced victory. I also aim to keep my argument tethered to
existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court has yet to address
squarely the issue of whether many forms of disclosure restriction are
constitutional. Nevertheless, there is support in the Court’s existing
doctrine for the constitutionality of many disclosure restrictions,
although there is also support for proponents of the free speech
critique. This is why my argument is not exclusively doctrinal; it is
also normative, as I aim to describe the way in which existing doctrine
should develop. In taking a normative stance, however, my goal is not
to make a radical break with the existing law, but to illustrate how
existing law could develop privacy protections while maintaining
fidelity to established free speech doctrine.
Broadly, this Part proceeds as follows. Section A discusses two
strands of the free speech critiqueabsolutism and balancing. For a
free speech absolutist, the only way to support privacy protections is
to argue that they do not infringe upon “speech.” This approach ends
up being less open and honest than a balancing approach. Under a
balancing approach, the free speech critique argues that speech has a
presumptively high value. I argue that not all speech is of equal value,
and speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of public
concern.
Section B argues that privacy interests often outweigh speech
about private matters. Privacy fares well in the balance under each of
the three predominant theories for the value of free speech.
Section C addresses the difficult issue of distinguishing between
speech of public concern and speech of private concern. Traditionally,
the law has drawn this distinction by deferring to the media, focusing
on the status of the individual as either a public or private figure, or
examining the nature of the information at issue. However, a better
approach would draw insights from evidence law by focusing on the
relationships in which information is transferred and the uses to
which it is put.
A. Absolutism vs. Balancing
At the most general level, there are two approaches to assessing
whether a particular law or regulation affecting speech violates the
First Amendment. Absolutists contend that if a particular use of
information constitutes speech, the law cannot regulate or prohibit its
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disclosure because the value of free speech is absolute. In contrast,
balancers assign a value to free speech and weigh it against competing
38
interests. A regulation violates the First Amendment if it is
outweighed in the balancing. In this Section, I critique the absolutist
position and endorse a balancing approach. However, even under a
balancing approach, the free speech critique remains quite powerful,
and it strives to apply strict scrutiny to most privacy protections that
implicate speech. I argue that privacy protections should be reviewed
under a less stringent form of scrutiny because they implicate speech
of private concern, which has less value than speech of public
concern.
1. Absolutism. The absolutist position toward the First
Amendment was most famously applied by Justice Hugo Black.39
Black argued that the First Amendment is an “unequivocal command
that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and
assembly.”40 Likewise, Jed Rubenfeld asserts that “there are certain
First Amendment absolutes, which stand up regardless of any
41
balancing of interests.” If one adopts such an absolutist position
toward free speech, privacy protections become difficult to defend.
No matter how valuable privacy protections might be, the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech remains absolute.
But there is a way for the absolutist to accept privacy protections.
One can escape First Amendment protection by contending that
certain types of personal information or uses of data are not speech.
When analyzing whether speech is protected by the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court initially asks whether “speech” is
implicated. What constitutes speech is a difficult question, as many
expressive activities are a combination of conduct and speech, such as

38. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 945 (1987) (“[A] ‘balancing opinion’ . . . analyzes a constitutional question by identifying
interests implicated by the case and reaches a decision . . . by explicitly or implicitly assigning
values to the identified interests.”).
39. Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1424
(1962); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
246.
40. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61, 63 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); see
also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 881 (1960) (“Our First
Amendment was a bold effort to . . . establish a country with no legal restrictions of any kind
upon the subjects people could investigate, discuss and deny.”).
41. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 770 (2001).
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42
43
44
wearing an armband, burning a flag, and dancing in the nude. For
the absolutist, certain categories of expression are not considered to
be speech at all, such as shouting fire in a crowded theater,
obscenity,45 “fighting words,”46 and child pornography.47 If speech is
not involved, then there is no need to take the First Amendment into
48
account.
Is personal information speech? Although a news story about a
person clearly involves speech, commentators debate whether the
transfer of databases of personal information also qualifies as speech.
Some commentators contend that such databases are transferred as a
“good,” not as “speech.” When companies “rent” their databases of
personal information to other companies, credit reporting agencies
issue reports about people’s financial condition, and marketers collect
and use personal information, these uses resemble business
transactions, such as the sale of a commodity, rather than an act of
expression. As Julie Cohen argues: “personally-identified data is not
collected, used or sold for its expressive content at all; it is a tool for
processing people, not a vehicle for injecting communication into the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”49 Cohen further contends:

The data is itself the subject matter of the transaction—the “goods”
exchanged. And, as distinct from news or literature, or from reports
of scientific research exchanged among colleagues, it isn’t purchased
to be “read.” Rather, it is purchased to serve a fundamentally
different sort of function—that of categorizing and segmenting a
50
customer base.

On the other hand, some commentators argue that the transfer of
databases of personal information can be thought of as speech—it

42. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding
that wearing an armband to protest the Vietnam war and advocate a truce was speech).
43. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
44. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570–71 (1991) (nude dancing is speech).
45. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
46. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
47. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
48. The argument that certain uses of information are not speech is not exclusively an
absolutist position. Balancers can also argue that certain information is not speech. In contrast
to absolutists, however, for balancers the designation of information as “speech” does not
immediately end the inquiry; speech must be balanced against the interest in restricting it.
49. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (2000).
50. Id. at 1417–18.
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informs another entity about potential new customers. Under this
view, one company is saying to another: “Take a look at John Doe.
Here is relevant information about why he might be a good customer.
These are his interests.” Of course, with massive databases of
personal information, the above statement is being made en masse
51
about millions of individuals, but it is still communicating something.
Volokh argues that databases of personal information and credit
reports are speech of significant importance, even when distributed
en masse. Information in databases can help people “find out with
52
whom they should do business.” In addition, disclosures by credit
reporting agencies assist people and companies when deciding
whether to give a person a loan or credit: “[I]t is no less speech when
a credit bureau sends credit information to a business. The owners
and managers of a credit bureau are communicating information to
decisionmakers, such as loan officers, at the recipient business.”53
Although credit reports are a lucrative “product” produced by credit
reporting agencies, they can be readily classified as a form of speech,
for they are telling creditors about the reputations of people.
There are no easy analytic distinctions as to what is or is not
“speech.” The “essence” of information is neither a good, nor is it
speech, for information can be used in ways that make it akin to
either one. It is the use of the information that determines what
information is, not anything inherent in the information itself. If I sell
you a book, I have engaged in a commercial transaction. I sold the
book as a good. However, the book is also expressing something.
Even though books are sold as goods, the government cannot pass a
law restricting the topics of what books can be sold.
“Speech” is very difficult to define. Volokh appears to view all
information dissemination that is communicative as speech. Under
Volokh’s view, therefore, most forms of information dissemination
would be entitled to equal First Amendment protection:
Though the Court has often said in dictum that political speech or
public-issue speech is on the “highest rung” of constitutional
protection, it has never held that there’s any general exception for
speech on matters of “private concern.” Political speech, scientific

51. See, e.g., Singleton, supra note 31, at 152 (“Throughout history, people have generally
been free to learn about one another in the course of business transactions and other day-to-day
contacts.”).
52. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1094.
53. Id. at 1083–84.
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speech, art, entertainment, consumer product reviews, and speech
on matters of private concern are thus all doctrinally entitled to the
same level of high constitutional protection, restrictable only
54
through laws that pass strict scrutiny.

However, Volokh’s view would lead to severe conflicts with
much modern regulation. Full First Amendment protection would
apply to statements about a company’s earnings and other
information regulated by the SEC, insider trading, quid pro quo
sexual harassment, fraudulent statements, perjury, bribery, blackmail,
extortion, conspiracy, and so on. One could neatly exclude these
examples from the category of speech, eliminating the necessity for
First Amendment analysis. Although this seems the easiest approach,
it is conceptually sloppy or even dishonest absent a meaningful way to
argue that these examples do not involve communication. I contend
that these examples of highly regulated forms of communication
have not received the full rigor of standard First Amendment analysis
because of policy considerations. Categorizing them as nonspeech
conceals these policy considerations under the façade of an analytical
distinction that thus far has not been persuasively articulated.
I am not eschewing all attempts at categorization between speech
and nonspeech. To do so would make the First Amendment
applicable to virtually anything that is expressive or communicative.
Still, the distinction as currently constituted hides its ideological
character.
Categories are artificial constructions and must be evaluated by
their usefulness. Dealing with privacy issues by categorizing personal
information as nonspeech is undesirable because it cloaks the real
normative reasons for why society wants to permit greater regulation
of certain communicative activity. Rather than focusing on
distinguishing between speech and nonspeech, the determination
about what forms of information to regulate should center on policy
considerations. These policy considerations should turn on the uses of
the information rather than on notions about the inherent nature of
the information.
2. Balancing. In contrast to absolutism, balancing does not view
the value of free speech as absolute. The value of free speech is
weighed against the benefits of speech restrictions. Although the

54.

Id.
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debate between absolutism and balancing has generated a substantial
55
body of literature, the balancing approach has largely prevailed.
Even Aleinikoff, one of the principal modern skeptics of balancing,
recognizes that balancing “has become widespread, if not dominant,
over the last four decades.”56 Accordingly, I address the remainder of
this Article to arguments involving balancing.
Proponents of the free speech critique have a strong argument
under a balancing approach. Because free speech is inscribed in the
57
Constitution, it has a presumptively high value. Americans have a
strong commitment to freedom of speech, deemed fundamental to a
free and democratic society. Therefore, even in a balancing approach,
the free speech critique contends that free speech must be valued very
highly, and it should trump most nonconstitutional interests.
Indeed, under the Court’s current balancing approach,
constitutional rights such as free speech weigh heavily. When an
expressive activity is deemed speech, the Court examines the nature
of the restriction and “balances” it against the government interest
supporting the restriction. Of course, “balancing” does not quite
capture what the Court does when it determines whether a statute is
58
viable under the First Amendment. The Court examines the law
55. Despite its dominance in constitutional jurisprudence, balancing has received ample
criticism. According to T. Alexander Aleinikoff, the Court has difficulty in “translat[ing] the
value of interests into a common currency for comparison.” Aleinikoff, supra note 38, at 973.
Frequently, the Court “adopts a seat-of-the-pants approach, freely speculating on the real world
consequences of particular rules.” Id. at 974. Although balancing can be performed in a shoddy
manner, the approach has many virtues. As I have previously argued, “[w]ith its greater focus
on empirical evidence in issues of constitutional interpretation, [balancing] brings law more in
tune with contemporary science, social science, economics, and other fields of human
knowledge.” Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 1021 (1999).
56. Aleinikoff, supra note 38, at 943.
57. Several scholars have attempted to translate the absolutist position into instrumental
terms. For example, Peter Edelman contends that “[a]bsolutists also engage in balancing of
interests, but the process occurs before they commit pen to paper.” Peter B. Edelman, Free
Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1213 (1990); see
also Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER’S, Feb. 1961, at 63, reprinted in CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE:
ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW 89, 94–96 (1963) (“[E]very bit of ‘balancing’ that could possibly enter
into the qualification of these rights can enter just as well into their definition as into a process
of denying them ‘absolute’ force after they are defined.”). Despite these attempts at translation,
there are fundamental differences between absolutism and balancing. Absolutism is a
deontological position, and those who argue that even absolutists “balance” are in essence
contending that the absolutists cheat on their own theoretical foundations.
58. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 711–12 (1994) (“Contrary to the connotations
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under a level of constitutional “scrutiny.” Under strict scrutiny, to
“outweigh” a First Amendment interest, a law must be the “least
59
restrictive means” to achieve a “compelling” government interest.
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to a
“substantial government interest.”60
Thus, the constitutional right and government interest are not
simply placed on a scale and weighed; rather, certain thresholds are
required for the weight of the government interest. The result is that,
even if a constitutional right has a relatively low value, the value of
the government interest must be more than marginally higher to
survive constitutional scrutiny. Thus, strict scrutiny, the highest level
of scrutiny, establishes a high minimum threshold for the value of free
speech. Accordingly, speech restrictions rarely outweigh speech under
strict scrutiny. Indeed, very few restrictions survive strict scrutiny,
61
which has been referred to as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”
When deciding what level of scrutiny to apply, courts look to
whether the regulation of speech is content-based or content-neutral.
A content-based regulation restricts speech based on its content—the
particular message or viewpoint being expressed. By contrast, a
content-neutral law regulates speech no matter what viewpoint the
speaker espouses; examples include restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of speech. For example, a noise ordinance regulates all
speech regardless of what is being said. Subject to certain exceptions,
content-based restrictions are accorded strict scrutiny,62 and contentneutral restrictions are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. The

suggested by the balancing metaphor, constitutional adjudication is often a qualitative process,
not a quantitative one. It is about defining the kinds of reasons that are impermissible
justifications for state action in different spheres.”).
59. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (striking down a
ban on indecent dial-a-porn services under strict scrutiny).
60. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding a restriction on burning
draft registration certificates under intermediate scrutiny). For more background on the
constitutional scrutiny tests, see Solove, supra note 55, at 954.
61. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
62. The most notable exception is the secondary effects doctrine. If the government
regulates a particular form of speech because of certain secondary effects, the Court has held
that this is not a content-based regulation even though it singles out particular forms of speech
based on content. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986)
(finding that an ordinance restricting the location of adult movie theaters was consistent with
the concept of a content-neutral regulation because its purpose was to prevent crime and the
other secondary effects of such theaters).
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free speech critique argues that privacy protections against disclosure
are content-based restrictions because they single out certain
messages invasive of privacy. Hence, they must be subject to strict
scrutiny.
If speech has a very high value, then protections against
disclosure would be subject to the highest form of constitutional
scrutiny, and would have to promote interests with an exceedingly
high value to survive. Moreover, the law must be the “least restrictive
means” to achieve the government interest—a very difficult standard
to satisfy. Volokh argues that privacy interests rarely rise to a level
worthy of withstanding strict scrutiny: “Why should the harm to my
child and my family stemming from the child’s exposure to online
indecency remain unprevented . . . when the indignity that someone
feels from having his shopping habits communicated by one business
63
to another justifies a speech restriction?” Volokh equates both types
of speech, and would protect both.
Privacy has a high value, as I argue in Section B (as well as in
Part II), but if the law assigns a default high value to all forms of
speech, the balancing will be quite difficult for privacy. I contend that
not all forms of speech have a high value. Some forms of speech have
a lower value and are more readily outweighed by privacy interests.
For example, Volokh’s question equates speech constituting online
indecency with speech between businesses about a person’s shopping
habits. However, these types of speech are quite different. Censoring
indecent speech that a child might encounter online creates a difficult
problem—how to protect the child yet also preserve the speech for
adults. This problem often does not emerge in the transfer of personal
information between businesses. A law prohibiting indecent speech is
likely to discriminate against certain viewpoints and to encompass
important political, artistic, and literary expression. In contrast, it is
unclear whether restricting the transfer of shopping data between
businesses will have similar potential downstream effects. Only in a
very formalistic sense can these two types of speech be viewed
as equivalent.
The conclusion that all speech does not have equal value runs
counter to the “neutrality principle,” which has long been a
cornerstone of traditional liberalism. According to the neutrality
principle, the government must maintain neutrality as to different

63.

Volokh, supra note 32, at 1104.
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64
conceptions of the good. In the context of free speech, the neutrality
principle mandates that the government must avoid favoritism or bias
65
toward particular messages. All speech must therefore be valued
equally. Allowing the government to ascribe different values to
different messages gives too much power to government officials to
pick and choose the messages they approve. This leads to
discrimination against unpopular ideas and the danger that minority
viewpoints will not be valued sufficiently.
Useful as neutrality may seem, however, it is a fiction.66 As
pragmatists persuasively argue, there is no way to perceive facts
outside of a particular context, and perception is infused with
67
partiality. According to John Dewey, “[a]ll knowing and effort to
know starts from some belief, some received and asserted meaning
which is a deposit of prior experience, personal and communal.”68
Building upon these ideas, legal realists contend that judges are not
oracles of the law, and they cannot magically eliminate all of their
69
own preconceptions and biases from their decisions. No matter the
effort, one cannot reach a position of pure neutrality.

64. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 392 (critiquing the traditional liberal view “requiring
neutrality with respect to competing visions of the good”).
65. See Police Dep’t or Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); EMERSON, supra note 35, at 326
(explaining that “value judgments concerned with the content of expression” are “foreclosed . . .
by the basic theory of the First Amendment”). For a good critique of the neutrality principle,
see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
66. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD
THING, TOO 11–16 (1994) (discussing nonconsequentialist positions concerning free speech and
their tendency to shift into consequentialism); id. at 15 (“Short of an absolutely absolutist
position (which no one holds or defends), a line must be drawn between protected speech and
speech that might in some circumstances be regulated, and that line will always reflect a political
decision to [value] some kinds of verbal behavior and devalue others.”); Balkin, supra note 64,
at 396 (“[T]he ideal of eliminating content based regulation was never realized in practice.”).
67. JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (1925), reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE
LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 107 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1987); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha,
Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative Jurisprudence, Sociolegal
Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 343–53 (1996) (discussing the
application of pragmatism and the inevitability of a context- and perspective-dependent
perception of facts).
68. DEWEY, supra note 67, at 320.
69. See generally Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997) (outlining the “Core Claims” and “Received View”
of realism and discussing the impact of realism on jurisprudence).
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Under current Supreme Court doctrine, not all forms of speech
70
71
are equally valued. For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
the Court noted that certain categories of speech, such as obscenity
and “fighting words,” “are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.”72 Commercial speech
also occupies a “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values.”73 Although this differential valuation is not a bad thing, the
fact that pure neutrality is neither possible nor optimal does not mean
that the quest for neutrality should be abandoned.
Scholars often view neutrality and balancing as antithetical
positions; one must strive to remain completely neutral or balance
each speech act individually. For example, Jed Rubenfeld makes a
straw man out of the balancing position, and he rejects any
74
classification of speech into “high” and “low” value categories.
Rubenfeld raises the example of racist speech, arguing that although
“[i]t is unquestionably protected by the First Amendment[,]. . . . how
can anyone purport to say with confidence that its ‘value’ exceeds its
costs?”75 Rubenfeld’s argument attacks balancers who would contend
that racist speech should receive First Amendment protection. How
can the ad hoc balancer justify such protection based on a cost-benefit
analysis? Rubenfeld concludes that “the cost-benefit approach offers
no adequate explanation of the categorical First Amendment
principle against viewpoint discrimination.”76
A balancer, however, can conclude that neutrality is still worth
pursuing to some degree, even if it cannot be perfectly achieved and
70. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985)
(“We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.”). Cass
Sunstein has argued that a workable system of free speech depends upon “making distinctions
between low and high value speech, however difficult and unpleasant that task may be.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 557 (1989). For a critique of the
high/low value speech classification, see Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L.
REV. 547 (1989). See also Susan M. Gilles, All Truths Are Equal but Are Some Truths More
Equal Than Others?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 725, 726 (1991) (arguing that it is dangerous “for
the Court to select among truths, declaring some ‘valuable’ (and thus, worthy of First
Amendment protection) and branding others ‘valueless’ (meriting little or perhaps no
protection)”).
71. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
72. Id. at 572.
73. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
74. Rubenfeld, supra note 41, at 822–26.
75. Id. at 825.
76. Id.
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even if it is not worth pursuing all the time. In the context of free
speech, the law should neither reject nor embrace neutrality
wholesale. It is appropriate to ascribe a different value to different
forms of speech, but only up to a point. Rubenfeld wrongly assumes
that the balancer must assess the value of protecting each speech act
by focusing myopically on the particular value of each speech act. But
a pragmatic analysis would also consider the systemic effects of the
77
particular case. An appropriate balance would consider the
downstream effects of a decision and the importance of striving
toward neutrality for particular forms of speech.
I propose that speech of private concern should be accorded less
protection than speech of public concern. The Supreme Court has
endorsed this view to a limited extent, in that the Court does value
78
different forms of speech differently. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
79
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the plurality concluded that “not all
speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on
‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection’. . . . In contrast, speech on matters of
purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”80
Regarding the specific facts of the case, the Court held that credit
reports should receive a low value under First Amendment analysis
because they do not concern a “public issue,” and because they
constitute “speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and
its specific business audience.”81 Although Dun & Bradstreet was a
defamation case, it should have wider applicability. Extending its
reasoning to personal information more generally, the case suggests
that speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of public
concern because it fails to promote the interests of free speech as
77. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 69 (2003)
(contending that decision according to rule, rather than ad hoc, can be pragmatic “because the
loss from ignoring the consequences in the particular case must be balanced against the gain
from simplifying inquiry, minimizing judicial discretion, increasing the transparency of law, and
making legal obligation more definite”).
78. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 10–39 (1990) (“[G]overnment hostility to particular points of view is often
acceptable, and evaluations of the value of speech run through the fabric of first amendment
law.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 84–100 (1978) (discussing the holdings and
reasoning of the Court in seven cases addressing subject-matter restrictions on speech).
79. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
80. Id. at 758–59 (footnote omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
81. Id. at 762.
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strongly as speech of public concern. This does not mean that speech
of private concern will lose out in the balancing; it simply means that
such speech will receive less weight and will more likely be subject to
regulation. Accordingly, in contrast to Volokh, who contends that the
First Amendment mandates strict scrutiny for most privacy
protections, I argue that a less stringent form of scrutiny should be
used.
The Court has made overtures toward such an approach in its
privacy law jurisprudence. In numerous cases, the Court has
articulated a public and private concern distinction, and it has applied
the First Amendment to curtail restrictions on speech of public
concern without answering questions about limiting speech of private
82
concern. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court held that
“if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter
of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
83
interest of the highest order.” In the Court’s latest case to touch
upon these issues, Bartnicki v. Vopper,84 it held that “privacy concerns
give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of
85
public importance.” In case after case the Court has refused to
address what, if any, constitutional scrutiny would apply to matters of
private concern. In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,86 the Court rejected the
“invitation to hold broadly that truthful publication may never be
punished consistent with the First Amendment. Our cases have
carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question.”87 As recently as
Bartnicki, the Court noted its “repeated refusal to answer
categorically whether truthful publication may ever be punished
consistent with the First Amendment.”88 The Court appears to view
the public and private concern distinction as having significance
because it has used this distinction to limit the application of
heightened scrutiny to restrictions on speech of public concern.
Although it has yet to address the private concern side of the
82. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
83. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
84. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
85. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
86. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
87. Id. at 532.
88. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529; accord Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)
(declining to “address the broader question [of] whether truthful publications may ever be
subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments”).
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distinction, the Court appears to be heading in the direction that
I advocate.
Nevertheless, such an approach must be squared with R.A.V. v.
89
City of St. Paul, in which the Court held that the government cannot
engage in “further content discrimination” when regulating low value
90
categories of speech. For example, “the government may proscribe
libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of
91
proscribing only libel critical of the government.” The Court’s
concern is to avoid viewpoint discrimination. Thus, content-based
distinctions can be made “[w]hen the basis for the content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable” because “no significant danger of idea
or viewpoint discrimination exists.”92 To the extent that the public and
private concern distinction is embodied in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, speech of private concern is a “class of speech” similar
to other classes of speech such as libel and commercial speech. R.A.V.
would not allow privacy protections to function as a proxy for
regulating particular viewpoints. Rather, R.A.V. would permit only
those privacy protections justified by the reasons that speech of
private concern is valued less than speech of public concern. It is to
this issue that I now turn.
B. Balancing Free Speech and Privacy
Thus far, I have argued that balancing is the most workable
approach for reconciling the tension between privacy protections and
free speech. Under such an approach, however, privacy protections
should not be reviewed under strict scrutiny, because speech of
private concern should be valued less than speech of public concern.
Thus, a lesser form of scrutiny should be employed. In this Section, I
explain why. The answer lies in the reasons why society values free
speech, the extent to which speech of private concern furthers these
interests, and the contributions of privacy protections toward
advancing these interests.
Numerous theories have been proposed to explain why free
speech is valuable. In this Section, I explore the most popular
theories: (1) individual autonomy, (2) democratic self-governance,
89.
90.
91.
92.

505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id. at 388.
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and (3) the marketplace of ideas. In discussing these theories under
separate headings, I do not intend to imply that they are mutually
93
exclusive. Free speech can be valued for a number of reasons. I
contend that under each theory, speech of private concern does not
strongly further the interests justifying free speech. If society wants to
promote the interests justifying free speech, a vigorous protection of
speech at the expense of privacy can, in fact, impair these interests.
1. Individual Autonomy. One of the most frequently articulated
rationales for the value of free speech is that it promotes individual
autonomy.94 As one commentator observes, the “value of free
expression . . . rests on its deep relation to self-respect arising from
95
autonomous self-determination.” The disclosure of personal
information about others certainly falls within the autonomy of the
speaker. Respect for autonomy requires recognition of strong rights
of self-expression. Disclosure protections thus impair the autonomy
of speakers who desire to speak about others. Additionally, free
speech can be justified in terms of the autonomy of the listener.96
Under this view, free speech protects people’s freedom of
information consumption. Disclosure protections prevent people
from hearing information that they want to know.
However, the autonomy justification cuts both ways in the
context of privacy protections against disclosures of personal
information. As Sean Scott observes, “the right to privacy and the
First Amendment both serve the same interest in individual
93. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL.
L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (discussing the interdependence of the theories concerning the value of
the First Amendment).
94. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 990–1009 (1978) (explaining three theoretical models addressing the scope of First
Amendment speech protection); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 875 (1994) (asserting and applying two theories relating to the autonomy-based First
Amendment doctrine); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591,
593 (1982) (“[F]ree speech ultimately serves only one true value, which I have labeled
‘individual self-realization.’”); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 204, 213–18 (1972) (asserting that the underlying theory of free expression is John
Stuart Mill’s principle that actions may be justified if they prevent harms); David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 353−60 (1991)
(arguing that the persuasion principle can be defended on autonomy grounds because violating
the principle interferes with a person’s control over her reasoning processes).
95. David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
96. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 139 (distinguishing between speaker and listener
autonomy).
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97
autonomy.” The disclosure of personal information can severely
inhibit a person’s autonomy and self-development.98 Julie Cohen
notes that “[a] realm of autonomous, unmonitored choice . . .
99
promotes a vital diversity of speech and behavior,” and the lack of
privacy “threatens not only to chill the expression of eccentric
individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our
aspirations to it.”100
The risk of disclosure can inhibit practices that may engender
101
social reprobation. Satisfaction of a person’s preference to engage in
an activity has a positive value unless that activity is socially
detrimental. Without protection against disclosure, the person might
not engage in that activity.102 Fear of disclosure also inhibits people
from exploring their preferences.103
Privacy permits individuals to contemplate and discuss political
change, create counterculture, or engage in a meaningful critique of
society. Privacy also enables creative expression that is often not
104
possible within the constraints of public life. People have the
opportunity to develop their views, political opinions, and artistic
expressions without having such information prematurely leaked to
the world, where harsh judgments and public opprobrium might crush
them. Growth and development require experimentation and the
opportunity to alter one’s opinions before making them public.105
Privacy allows people to speak anonymously, encouraging robust

97. Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L. REV. 683,
723 (1996).
98. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1665 (1999) (noting that privacy shapes “the extent to which certain actions or expressions of
identity are encouraged or discouraged”).
99. Cohen, supra note 49, at 1425.
100. Id. at 1426; see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A
FREE SOCIETY 44 (1988) (“The value of privacy is, in part, that it can enable moral persons to
be self-determining individuals.”); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J.
421, 455 (1980) (“Privacy is also essential to democratic government because it fosters and
encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy.”).
101. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2397 (1996).
102. Id. at 2398.
103. Id. at 2397–98.
104. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 37 (1967).
105. See id. at 33–34 (“Such independence [in thought and views] requires time for sheltered
experimentation and testing of ideas, for preparation and practice in thought and conduct,
without fear of ridicule or penalty, and for the opportunity to alter opinions before making them
public.”).
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communication without fear of community reprisal. As Cohen points
106
out, privacy also facilitates the reading and consumption of ideas.
All of these activities are central to autonomy and self-determination.
If the interest of the speaker or listener is defined in terms of
self-determination and autonomy, the interest of the harmed
individual can be conceptualized in similar terms—as an assault on
self-determination and autonomy. There is no clear reason why the
autonomy of speakers or listeners should prevail over that of the
harmed individuals.
One could argue that free speech protects autonomy more than
privacy does, because free speech promotes the interests not only of
the speaker but also of all who listen to the message. Under this view,
privacy only protects the autonomy of the injured individual. This
argument, however, understands the interest protected by privacy too
narrowly. Just as the protection of speech has implications for all
speakers and all listeners, privacy protection reaches beyond the
specific individual whose privacy is involved in a given case. It
protects everyone. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether free speech
or privacy promotes more autonomy; both further autonomy, just in
different ways and in different aspects of life.
2. Democratic Self-Governance. Another theory of free speech
locates its value not in its protection of the individual, but in its
107
furtherance of democratic self-governance. As Justice Brandeis
108
famously observed in Whitney v. California:
[W]ithout free speech and assembly[,] discussion would be futile; . .
. with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; . . . the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; . . . public discussion is a
political duty; and . . . this should be a fundamental principle of the
109
American government.

106. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1012–13 (1996).
107. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the First Amendment, 34
CONN. L. REV. 405, 412–17 (2002) (noting that free speech enables citizens to engage in
informed deliberation and to make wise choices in the process of self-governance).
108. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
109. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Similarly, Alexander Meiklejohn views the value of free speech in
110
terms of its contribution to political discourse. According to
Meiklejohn, “[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but
111
that everything worth saying shall be said.” Under this justification,
however, only speech that contributes to self-governance is protected.
As Owen Fiss observes, “[s]peech is valued so importantly in the
Constitution . . . not because it is a form of self-expression or selfactualization but rather because it is essential for collective selfdetermination.”112
However, speech of private concern often does not promote
democratic self-governance. For example, it is difficult to justify how
the sale from one company to another of mailing lists about people’s
hobbies and incomes promotes democratic self-governance.
Additionally, the reporting of one’s personal secrets often does not
illuminate the sphere of politics. In fact, privacy protections against
disclosure strongly promote democratic self-governance. As Keith
Boone contends: “Privacy seems vital to a democratic society
[because] it underwrites the freedom to vote, to hold political
discussions, and to associate freely away from the glare of the public
113
eye and without fear of reprisal.” Thus, privacy can contribute to a
robust public life rather than detracting from it.
Privacy encourages uninhibited speech by enabling individuals to
direct frank communication to those people they trust and who will
not cause them harm because of what they say. Important discourse,
especially communication essential for democratic participation, often
takes place in microlevel contexts (between two people or in small
110. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 154–55 (1960) (noting that the First and Fifth Amendments “requir[e]
of free citizens and of free institutions that they resist with all their might the irresponsible
usurpations of a legislature which would attempt to tell men what they may believe and what
they may not believe, with whom they may associate and with whom they may not associate”).
111. Id. at 26.
112. OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996). As Owen Fiss further argues:
On the whole does [speech] enrich public debate? Speech is protected
when (and only when) it does, and precisely because it does, not because it
is an exercise of autonomy. In fact, autonomy adds nothing and[,] if need
be . . . might have to be sacrificed, to make certain that public debate is
sufficiently rich to permit true collective self-determination.
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1411 (1986); see also
OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE
POWER 36–38 (1996) (“[A]utonomy is not protected as an end in itself . . . . Rather, it is seen as
a way of furthering the larger political purposes attributed to the First Amendment.”).
113. C. Keith Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 1, 8 (1983).
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groups) rather than in macrolevel contexts (public rallies or
nationwide television broadcasts). Indeed, a significant amount of
political discussion occurs not on soapboxes or street corners, but
within private conversations. Protections against disclosure enable us
to communicate with others without risking more widespread
disclosure. Communication often occurs within the context of a
relationship, in which people already share mutual knowledge, and
their communication is frequently part of a continuing dialogue. For
this reason, communication is especially prone to misinterpretation
when disclosed to people lacking the same background information.
Further, much communication occurs only because of the trust that
has developed between communicants; without privacy, people might
not communicate many ideas. People might be more reluctant to
criticize aspects of their public lives, such as their employers, if they
114
could not do so in private. The threat of disclosure probably will not
end all conversations, but it will alter what is said. Therefore, privacy
protections do not just inhibit free speech; they can promote it as
well.
One criticism of the view that privacy helps promote free speech
is that the Constitution protects speech, not privacy. Volokh argues:
[T]he speech vs. privacy and speech vs. speech tensions are not
tensions between constitutional rights on both sides. The
Constitution presumptively prohibits government restrictions on
speech and perhaps some government revelation of personal
information, but it says nothing about interference with speech or
115
revelation of personal information by nongovernmental speakers.

Although Volokh reads the First Amendment narrowly to focus
primarily on speech, freedom of speech and the press are only one
dimension of the First Amendment. It also explicitly protects the right
to assemble, the right to petition one’s government, and the right to
116
free exercise of religion. The First Amendment is thus about much
more than speech. Indeed, the First Amendment has been interpreted
rather expansively—beyond merely protecting speech—to promote
democratic self-governance. For example, in one series of cases the
114. WESTIN, supra note 104, at 35.
115. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1107.
116. The full text of the First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Court held that the First Amendment creates a right to access certain
judicial proceedings because a “major purpose” of the Amendment is
117
“to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”
First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes the importance of
privacy in promoting First Amendment interests. The First
118
Amendment protects freedom of association, which is integral to
the formation of political views and the execution of political action.119
Protection against disclosure protects freedom of association, for it
enables people to join together and exchange information without
having to fear loss of employment, community shunning, and other
social reprisals.120 Freedom of association guards against the “tyranny
of the majority,”121 for it allows those with minority viewpoints to
form into groups to achieve greater social power. Privacy enables
minorities and outsider groups freedom for self-development and
group interaction without undue impingement by the norms of the
majority.
Furthermore, the Court recognizes that the privacy involved in
anonymous communication can be essential for the promotion of free
122
speech. In Talley v. California, the Court struck down an ordinance
117. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). See also Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment mandates access to
preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 509 & n.8, 513 (1984)
(recognizing that the First Amendment mandates public access to voir dire). For more
background on the First Amendment right to access court proceedings, see Daniel J. Solove,
Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137,
1201–06 (2002).
118. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to
assemble.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
119. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (Phillips Bradley trans.,
Vintage Books 1990) (1840):
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of
combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common
with them. The right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalienable
in its nature as the right of personal liberty.
120. See EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 125 (1978) (arguing
that group privacy “requires that people reveal themselves to one another—breach their
individual privacy—and rely on those with whom they associate to keep within the group what
was revealed”); see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (noting that the
disclosure of NAACP’s members and contributors is unconstitutional because disclosure would
lead to “community hostility and economic reprisals”); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–
63 (1958) (“[C]ompelled disclosure . . . may induce members to withdraw from the Association
and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through
their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.”).
121. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 119, at 194.
122. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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prohibiting the distribution of anonymous pamphlets. The Court
noted the profound importance of anonymous speech, especially to
enable “[p]ersecuted groups and sects” to “criticize oppressive
123
practices.” The Court explained that “identification and fear of
reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
124
importance.” Similarly, in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v.
Village Of Stratton,125 the Court struck down an ordinance requiring
door-to-door solicitors to identify themselves and their organizations
because it “may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular
causes.”126 The anonymity cases broadly demonstrate the important
connection between privacy and speech. Without privacy, certain core
political speech would not occur.
It is certainly true that the freedom of association and anonymity
cases involve government disclosures rather than disclosures by
nongovernmental parties. Nevertheless, these cases illustrate the link
between privacy and the interests promoted by the First Amendment.
127
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court partially struck down a
provision in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act that made
people liable for disclosing information that they knew was obtained
by an illegal wiretap.128 The Court limited its holding to information of
public concern.129 In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer stated that
the Court’s constitutional analysis should focus on “whether the
statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speech-restricting
and speech-enhancing consequences.”130 He noted that the “statutory
restrictions before us directly enhance private speech” because
“[m]edia dissemination of an intimate conversation to an entire
community will often cause the speakers serious harm over and above
the harm caused by an initial disclosure to the person who intercepted
the phone call.”131 According to Rodney Smolla, “Bartnicki accepted
123. Id. at 64.
124. Id. at 65. See also Buckley v. Amer. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 200
(1999) (striking down statute requiring individuals handing out petitions to wear nametags);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–43 (1995) (holding that a ban on the
anonymous distribution of campaign literature violates the First Amendment).
125. 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002).
126. Id. at 2090.
127. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
128. See id. at 535 (concluding that the First Amendment protects disclosure of illegally
obtained information of public concern by an unknown person).
129. Id. at 533–34.
130. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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the premise that the conflict posed between speech and privacy is a
conflict between two rights of constitutional stature. By this
important measure, all nine Justices in Bartnicki were in
132
agreement.”
Volokh’s argument rests on the view that the Constitution
protects only negative liberty—freedom from government
interference. Negative liberty is the central focus in John Stuart Mill’s
133
On Liberty, and Mill described freedom of speech in negative terms,
pointing out when the government should refrain from regulating
speech. Under Volokh’s negative liberty view of the First
Amendment, restrictions on speech that result in a net increase in the
promotion of First Amendment interests are still unconstitutional.
But there is another form of liberty—positive liberty—which
involves instances in which the state should protect liberty by means
134
of affirmative regulation. According to John Dewey, liberty is an
evolving concept, and the state must often act affirmatively to ensure
135
liberty. Cass Sunstein and others argue that the Constitution should
(and does) mandate the protection of positive liberty.136 But even if
the Constitution does not provide for positive liberty, it need not be
hostile to legislative attempts to achieve positive liberty. Privacy
regulations that promote speech should not simply be viewed in terms
of their speech-restrictive elements; they should be understood
holistically, in terms of their overall purpose in the protection of free
speech. We protect free speech to promote certain ends. Volokh loses
sight of the ends of the First Amendment by focusing too heavily on
the means.
132. Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for
Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1150 (2002).
133. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (“[T]he sole end for
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number, is self-protection.”).
134. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xxxvii–lxiii (1969); Isaiah Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, supra, at 118, 118–72. Cass Sunstein terms
the positive liberty approach to free speech the “New Deal” approach. Cass R. Sunstein, Free
Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263–300 (1992).
135. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935), reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY:
THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 1, 18 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1987).
136. In a related manner, Cass Sunstein argues that “legal rules designed to promote
freedom of speech should not be invalidated if their purposes and effects are constitutionally
valid, even if they conspicuously intrude on the rights of some property owners and even some
speakers.” SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 37. Sunstein argues that “constitutional validity should
be assessed in Madisonian terms: Do the rules promote greater attention to public issues? Do
they ensure greater diversity of view?” Id.
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3. The Marketplace of Ideas. A third well-known justification
for free speech is that it contributes to the promotion of truth. This
justification was most famously propounded by John Stuart Mill, who
observed that government censorship of speech destroys “the
137
opportunity of exchanging error for truth.” “All silencing of
discussion is an assumption of infallibility,” argued Mill, and those
138
“who desire to suppress [free speech] are not infallible.” As Isaiah
Berlin notes, Mill’s argument assumes that knowledge is “in principle
never complete, and always fallible” and that there is “no single,
universally visible, truth.”139
Justice Holmes drew from this theory when he articulated the
notion of the marketplace of ideas:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
140
wishes safely can be carried out.

The marketplace of ideas locates the value of free speech in finding
the truth, and it makes the market the arbiter of truth or falsity.
Hence, the law must avoid becoming involved in discerning true and
false information—only the market should decide. Under this
rationale, the First Amendment should prohibit privacy protections
on disclosure because they hinder the quest for the truth.
However, the marketplace theory assumes that the value of truth
is nearly absolute, an assumption that is not always correct. Frederick
Schauer contends that commentators have too readily assumed that
141
“truth is an ultimate, irreducible, and noninstrumental value.”
Instead, truth is a value that must be weighed against other values.

137. MILL, supra note 133, at 18.
138. Id.
139. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 134, at 188.
140. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
141. Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699,
706 (1991); see also Anita L. Allen, The Power of Private Facts, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757,
766 (1991) (arguing that allocations of power can sometimes be more valuable than the
protection of true speech); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to
Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2036 (2001) (“The belief that more personal information
always reveals more truth is ideology, not fact, and must be recognized as such for informational

SOLOVE.DOC

2003]

07/07/04 1:38 PM

THE VIRTUES OF KNOWING LESS

999

As I argue throughout this Article, the law of evidence has much
to teach us. The law of evidence has long recognized privacy as an
important goal that can override the truth-seeking function of the
trial; valuable evidence is excluded from trials based on evidentiary
privileges. As one nineteenth-century English judge observed:
Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely—may be
pursued too keenly—may cost too much. And surely . . . the general
evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion
and fear, into those communications which must take place, and
which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place
142
uselessly or worse, [is] too great a price to pay for truth itself.

There are many “truths” that are not worth much effort to find
out. For example, there is a true answer to the number of paperclips I
have in my office, but this information does not have much value.
Much true information is trivial and useless. The value of the quest
for the truth depends upon what information one is seeking. What is
the value of the truth about a private figure’s personal life? The
marketplace theory does not provide an answer. In fact, the
marketplace theory is really an argument for neutrality: because
everyone is fallible, it is best to leave free speech unencumbered.
Neutrality may be desirable when it comes to ideas and opinions
about public matters, and this is the focus of Mill’s powerful argument
against government censorship in On Liberty. Speech about private
matters, however, is different. In many instances, as I argue in Part II,
privacy outweighs the value of true speech. Also, as Part II discusses,
if one is committed to the quest for truth, the disclosure of true
private information can actually inhibit this pursuit.143
Therefore, restrictions on speech of private concern should
receive less stringent scrutiny than do restrictions on speech of public
concern. If we value free speech instrumentally, then the law should
maximize the interests justifying free speech. A balance between
privacy and speech achieves these interests better than protecting
speech alone. Even if speech is valuable for its own sake, privacy can
privacy to have a chance.”). For a critique of Schauer’s position, see Erwin Chemerinsky, In
Defense of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 745 (1991).
142. Pearse v. Pearse, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (Ch. 1846) (Bruce, V.C.).
143. One might counter that when the government declares that certain truths are of less
value than others, the government is interfering in the debate. To assess the value of a truthseeking activity, one must engage in it. Therefore, restricting a truth-seeking activity inhibits our
ability to ascribe the appropriate value to it. In response to this argument, we already have
ample experience with speech of private concern to assess its value appropriately.
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enhance freedom of speech more than a rigid protection of all forms
of speech. Because the disclosure of private information can inhibit
free speech, we cannot assume that all restrictions on speech will
cause a net loss to freedom of speech. In fact, some restrictions on
speech can enhance our freedom to speak.
Underpinning the discussion thus far is the distinction between
public and private concerns. I have argued that personal information
of public concern has a much higher value than personal information
relating to a private concern. The next Section explores how the law
should distinguish between speech of public and private concern.
C. Distinguishing Public from Private Concerns
How should the law distinguish between speech of public and
private concern? Dun & Bradstreet did not elaborate upon the
meaning of the public and private concern distinction when holding
144
that credit reports were of private concern. Likewise, the Court’s
privacy law cases—Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,145 Florida Star
v. B.J.F.,146 and Bartnicki v. Vopper147—did little to define the
distinction.
The distinction between public and private concerns is more fully
developed in the tort of public disclosure. In this context, the
prevailing approach for balancing First Amendment interests with
privacy is the newsworthiness test, which prohibits liability when
148
The
information is of “legitimate concern to the public.”
newsworthiness test is an element of the tort, a built-in protection for
the free speech. Information is of public concern when “the public has
a proper interest in learning about [it].”149 For example, the
Restatement of Torts distinguishes between “information to which
the public is entitled” and “morbid and sensational prying into private
lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public,
with decent standards, would say that he had no concern.”150

144. Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic
Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1540 (1987).
145. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
146. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
147. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 11, § 652D.
149. Id. § 652D cmt. d.
150. Id. § 652D cmt. h.
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The newsworthiness test emerges from Warren and Brandeis’s
151
article, The Right to Privacy. According to Warren and Brandeis,
“[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter
152
which is of public or general interest.” Smolla reads Bartnicki to be
“inviting the importation into First Amendment jurisprudence of the
‘newsworthiness’ analysis as it has developed so far in common-law
cases.”153 Therefore, it is appropriate to turn to the public disclosure
tort cases for guidance on how courts have distinguished between
matters of public and private concern.
Courts have long struggled when applying the newsworthiness
154
test, and they have adopted a number of different approaches.
Among the approaches to distinguishing public from private
concerns, three predominate: (1) deferring to the media; (2) focusing
on the status of the individual, e.g., whether she is a public or private
figure; and (3) examining the nature of the information, e.g., whether
it relates to public affairs or matters typically considered private, such
as sex and health. Some approaches involve a combination of (2) and
(3). I contend that all of these approaches are deeply flawed.
Nevertheless, I do not recommend that the attempt to distinguish
between speech of public and private concern be abandoned. Courts
have entrenched the distinction in the doctrine, and the Supreme
Court has begun to incorporate it into its jurisprudence. Because I
advocate developing the existing doctrine rather than writing on a
clean slate, I propose a new approach to making the distinction,
rather than a more radical change in the distinction itself.
1. Prevailing Approaches.
a. Deference to the Media. A number of courts defer to the
editorial judgment of the media to distinguish between public and
155
private concerns. As one court noted: “[W]hat is newsworthy is

151. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 214–16.
152. Id. at 214.
153. Smolla, supra note 132, at 1153.
154. See Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85
KY. L.J. 147, 157–64 (1997) (describing five different approaches that courts have used to
analyze the newsworthiness defense).
155. Wagner v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 307 F.2d 409, 410–11 (7th Cir. 1962); Jenkins v. Dell Publ’g.
Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451–52 (3d Cir. 1958); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp.
957, 960–61 (D. Minn. 1948).
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156
primarily a function of the publisher, not the courts.” Similarly,
Harry Kalven agrees that the media “must in the nature of things be
157
the final arbiter of newsworthiness.” This is called the “leave-it-to158
the-press” approach.
The leave-it-to-the-press approach turns on a distrust of the
legislature (statutory disclosure restrictions) and of judges and juries
(privacy torts). Can these decisionmakers be entrusted to determine
what is newsworthy? Volokh argues that it is extremely problematic
when the government decides what subjects people can talk about.
Specifically, Volokh observes:

Under the First Amendment, it’s generally not the government’s job
to decide what subjects speakers and listeners should concern
themselves with. A private concern exception essentially says “you
have no right to speak about topics that courts think are not of
legitimate concern to you and your listeners,” a view that’s
159
inconsistent with this understanding.

If courts, legislatures, or juries defer to the press, then the
newsworthiness standard is practically eviscerated. On the other
hand, if they do not defer, then they are establishing limits to editorial
judgment, which critics argue is paternalistic.
The result is a complicated legal process determination about
who is the best decisionmaker: legislatures, judges or juries, or
journalists. As Diane Zimmerman argues, the press “has a better
mechanism for testing newsworthiness than do the courts. . . . Unlike
judges and jurors, the press must develop a responsiveness to what
substantial segments of the population want (and perhaps even need)
160
to know to cope with the society in which they live.” Proponents of
156. Heath v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
157. Kalven, supra note 28, at 336.
158. Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 353; see also Leon Green, Continuing the Privacy
Discussion: A Response to Judge Wright and President Bloustein, 46 TEX. L. REV. 750, 753
(1968) (noting that “the sense of decency of the important publication media” would restrict
reported cases to those in which “the dignitary harms inflicted would probably be considered
overbalanced by the newsworthiness of the items published”). Rodney Smolla suggests that the
“leave-it-to-the-press” approach is buttressed by “legal and cultural forces.” Rodney A. Smolla,
Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L. REV. 289, 304 (2002).
Smolla notes that there is an “ingrained skepticism” for restricting the publication of true
information and a “reflexive wariness” of permitting the government to “second-guess” the
judgment of speakers about what is “worthy of being said.” Id.
159. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1089 (citation omitted).
160. Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 353–54; see also Kalven, supra note 28, at 336 (“[T]he
press must in the nature of things be the final arbiter of newsworthiness.”).
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deference to the media conclude that journalists are the best
decisionmakers because they are most responsive to what the public
will find interesting. Under this view, the media will be responsive to
market pressures, and the market reflects what the public wants to
161
know. Although the media may make the initial decision to report a
story, if the public lacks interest, ratings will eventually plummet. The
market thus provides feedback to the media about the kinds of stories
that the public desires.
Even if the media is the most accurate decisionmaker for gauging
public interest, it might not be the best decisionmaker for determining
what is newsworthy. What is of interest to most of society is not the
same question as what is of legitimate public concern. It is possible
that people will want to hear a story even when they do not consider
it of legitimate public concern. For example, a video of Pamela
Anderson Lee having sex with Bret Michaels was sold over the
162
Internet, generating hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue. A
video of the president giving a speech would be much less lucrative.
Does this make the sex tape more newsworthy? The market measures
the public’s interest in a particular matter, but this interest can stem
from a desire for entertainment or sexual pleasure just as much as it
can from wanting to learn about the news and current events.163
Although it is often assumed that the market represents an
accurate reflection of the public’s preferences in the aggregate, this
assumption is false not only because the media actively shapes the
market, but also because market pressures are not always in sync with
164
public demand. Journalists are not simply responsive to market
forces; they also influence the market by defining and enlarging the
public sphere. By reporting a particular story, the media can generate
attention for that story that might not otherwise exist, because many
people consume news based on brand name rather than content. In
161. Edwin Baker has extensively critiqued the view that the market is the appropriate
mechanism to measure what media products the public wants to consume. C. EDWIN BAKER,
MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 63–95 (2002). Baker argues that the market weighs the
preferences of the wealthy more heavily than those of the poor because the wealthy are willing
to pay more to satisfy their preferences. Id. at 72. However, “[n]othing about being wealthy
implies that a person’s preferences are stronger.” Id.
162. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(acknowledging the president of Internet Entertainment Group’s estimate that the company
would lose one third of its $1,495,000 subscription revenue without the Bret Michaels and
Pamela Anderson sex video).
163. I thank Lior Strahilevitz for suggesting this example to me.
164. See supra note 161.
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other words, people read their daily papers and watch their favorite
television news programs; often they do not select whether to read or
watch each particular story. The media is also a powerful shaper of
privacy norms in society. As more stories report on private matters,
our expectations of privacy change. Therefore, the media does not
simply react to public demand; it manufactures demand by
reconstructing the public sphere to include more private matters. The
mass media, Jhrgen Habermas argues, has become transformed into
165
“primarily a business.” It no longer amplifies public debate, but
166
actively shapes it.
Moreover, widely reported stories are difficult for people to
ignore. People generally discuss what is in the news, but not
necessarily because it is of the most interest to them. Often, people
discuss whatever news the media provides. The press creates interest
in particular events. We want to find out whether the baby who falls
into a well is rescued because we are now in the middle of a story.
The media often bases decisions about what stories to run upon
assumptions that its audience is relatively unintelligent, has a very
short attention span, and is unable to deal with nuance, ambiguity,
and complexity. According to a Pew poll, 77 percent of journalists
avoid stories that they think are “important but dull,” and 52 percent
167
avoid “overly complex stories.” Even if the media’s perceptions of
the public are true, the way that people are treated can become a selffulfilling prophecy. Educational studies, for example, show that
students perform significantly better when teachers expect them to
perform at a high ability level.168 The media does more than merely
report; it educates and indoctrinates. It therefore is not merely
responsive to the public, but it shapes the public as well.
Proponents of deference can respond by pointing out that the
media can and does exercise self-restraint in many cases. For
165. JhRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE
184 (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1989) (1962).
166. Id. at 188.
167. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Self Censorship: How Often and Why
(Apr. 30, 2000), at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=39 (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
168. See Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children
and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 142 n.210 (1997) (noting that “students
perform in accordance with their teachers’ expectations of their abilities”); Angelia Dickens,
Note, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: How Tracking Has Resegregated America’s
Public Schools, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 469, 477–78 (1996) (discussing how teachers’
“lower expectations become a self-fulfilling prophecy”).
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example, during the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the media
169
avoided reporting on his sexual infidelities. Today, this norm has
changed, as was emphatically demonstrated by the extensive
reporting on President Clinton’s affairs. Although the media readily
plunders the private lives of politicians, it continues to exercise great
restraint with their children. President Clinton actively worked to
keep his daughter, Chelsea, away from the media;170 the media
avoided coverage of Chelsea.171 When Chelsea attended Stanford
University, the editors of the Stanford Daily even resolved to fire any
member of its staff who disclosed information about Chelsea to the
public.172 The press has also exercised restraint for President Bush’s
daughters, and when one daughter was arrested for underage
drinking, the media was deeply divided about the extent of coverage
to give to the story.173 These norms exist in spite of great public
interest in the children’s lives and despite the fact that some voters
may find information about a politician’s children to be relevant to
their overall assessment of the politician.
Another longstanding media norm is refraining from identifying
rape victims. For example, in August 2002, two teenage girls were
kidnapped and raped. While they were captive, their names and
photographs were widely broadcast to assist in the search. Once they
were found alive, most of the media ceased displaying their names

169. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 134 (1992) (“When the
press avoided reporting on the sexual liaisons of John Kennedy, however, it engaged in a
paternalistic decision that the behavior was not probative of Kennedy’s fitness for public life.”);
Jeffrey B. Abramson, Four Criticisms of Press Ethics, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA
229, 234 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990) (“There was also the nonreporting of the love lives of
Lloyd George, Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Martin Luther
King, Jr.”).
170. See Ellen O’Brien, Chelsea Comes of Age, but Not Before Our Eyes, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 4, 1994, at 1 (“That Chelsea has led a life outside the public eye is no accident; the Clintons
have worked hard at it.”).
171. Joan Ryan, Clintons Let Go—Chelsea Enters Stanford, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 20, 1997, at
A1; see Howard Kurtz, First Daughter’s Privacy No Longer Off Limits, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov.
27, 1998, at 32 (“For six years the media followed an unspoken pact to avoid coverage of
Chelsea Clinton, allowing the president’s daughter to grow up outside the harsh glare of
publicity.”).
172. Ryan, supra note 171.
173. See, e.g., Gail Collins, The Children’s Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A23
(arguing that “it’s always news when the offspring of important elected officials break the law,”
but noting that when “there’s no legal issue involved, it’s a judgment call”); Joanne Ostrow,
Don’t Beat About the Bush Kids, DENVER POST, June 10, 2001, at K1 (questioning whether “the
media [went] overboard in reporting Jenna Bush’s recent underage drinking citation”).
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174
175
and photographs. Although this norm is widely followed, there are
occasional violators, a recent example being the radio commentator
who disclosed the identity of Kobe Bryant’s alleged sexual assault
victim.176
The media’s norms do not always align with society’s norms.
Perhaps this disparity accounts for the public’s general distrust of the
media. In a December 2001 Harris Poll, for example, journalists
ranked close to the bottom of seventeen professions, earning the trust
177
of only 49 percent of poll respondents. The same disparities also
apply to norms about privacy. In a poll by the Center for Media and
Public Affairs, 80 percent of the public responded that the media
“often invade[] people’s privacy.”178
Media self-restraint is difficult to achieve because the media is
far from a monolithic entity. There are many different styles of
journalism, and a vast number of media entities cater to different
tastes. If the New York Times will not report it, the National Enquirer
will. As a result, certain segments of the media—such as tabloids—
may routinely run stories that a majority of the media does not
consider newsworthy. Such differences reflect the different norms
within the various segments of the media.
Furthermore, a collective action problem exaggerates the
differences between societal and media norms. As Jack Balkin argues,
“journalists as a whole face a collective action problem in maintaining
the boundaries of what is public and what is private. If one journalist
changes the contours of the public through a series of revelations,
179
other journalists may feel compelled to follow along.” In other
words, if a segment of the media breaks a story that other segments
do not find newsworthy, the other segments may change their view
because “[j]ournalists may feel duty bound to report whatever is in

174. David Bauder, Identifying Rape Victims Troubles Media, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Aug. 3, 2002, at 3A; Richard Roeper, Case Shows Absurdity of Media’s Rape ID
Policy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at 11.
175. See Roeper, supra note 174 (“So the media were tripping all over themselves trying to
stick to policy—but hardly anyone questioned whether the policy itself is outdated.”).
176. Chris Frates, L.A. Radio Show Names Bryant’s Accuser, DENVER POST, July 24, 2003,
at B1.
177. Humphrey Taylor, Whom Do We Trust to Tell the Truth? Whom Do We Trust the
Least?, THE HARRIS POLL (Dec. 12, 2001), at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/
printerfriend/index.asp?PID=273 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
178. John Carmody, The TV Column, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1997, at B6.
179. J.M. Balkin, How Mass Media Simulate Political Transparency, 3 CULTURAL VALUES
393, 402 (1999).
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180
fact in the public sphere of discussion.” The argument for not
regulating the norms of smaller segments of the media is often made
in the service of promoting pluralism—allowing different types of
stories for different tastes. Those interested in prurience and
peccadilloes can tune into tabloid television; those interested in
politics and policies can turn to a respectable news channel. In the
end, however, there may be less pluralism, not more. Because the rest
of the media may be pressured into following along, the result tends
toward uniformity. The respectable news channel, for example, may
gradually gravitate toward reporting on issues that it ordinarily would
never have covered or would have covered only in very little depth.
Allowing media norms to develop on their own could shift
coverage toward the sensationalistic, which might be optimal for
media profit margins but not for society as a whole. Under numerous
theories of democracy, information is essential for public discourse.
However, journalists do not necessarily increase the total information
available to the public by reporting on private matters. Rather, as
Balkin argues, “journalists may in fact simply be altering the mix of
stories presented to the public; the practical effect [being] a
181
contraction of the scope of public discourse.” Balkin’s argument is
similar to what Warren and Brandeis argued in 1890: “When personal
gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for
matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the
ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance.”182 Left
unchecked, the media alters the nature of public discourse. Therefore,
public discourse should not be defined exclusively by the norms of
one social sector (the media), especially when those norms often do
not mirror those of the rest of society.
Although the media may have deficiencies as a decisionmaker,
are courts, juries, or legislatures better? Certainly, one cannot say that
systematically, courts/juries and legislatures are better than the media
at determining what is of public or private concern. Each type of
entity has special abilities and faults. Legislatures, courts, and juries
are sometimes representative of the populace. On the other hand,
legislatures can also be captured by special interests, and juries can be
overly influenced by a sympathetic plaintiff or an eloquent attorney.
There is no single optimal decisionmaker, but the combination of all

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 196.
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of these decisionmakers is preferable to the dominance of only one.
Thus, the public disclosure tort is a way for society to inform the
media that it disapproves of the balance that the media has struck
with privacy. I use the word “society” rather than “government”
because there are many times in which legislatures, judges, and juries
can speak for society. The problem, of course, is that no one
institution can completely and precisely represent society.
Like most social institutions, the media is flawed. It is also
tremendously powerful, and given this reality, it might not be wise to
accord it deference. Thus, the media should not have a monopoly on
determining what is of public concern. Ultimately, such an important
decision is for all of society to make, not just one segment of society
or one type of social institution.
b. The Status of the Individual. In another approach to
distinguishing between public and private concerns, courts frequently
look to the status of the individual whose information is disclosed.
This approach looks to whether the person is a public or private
figure, with the general rule that disclosures of information about
public figures are of public concern. For example, Rodney Smolla
argues that public figures should not be permitted to sue for public
disclosure, even if the information is not newsworthy: “[W]hen public
figures are involved, it is impossible to reach a judgment that a fact is
or is not newsworthy without engaging in value judgments that draw
183
from ideological and cultural biases.” Thus, Smolla contends that
the law should protect private figures but not public ones.
The distinction between public and private figures hails from
defamation law. Public figures include not only politicians and public
officials, but famous people, celebrities, and people involved in public
184
controversies. Originally, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Court provided strict limits on defamation recovery for public
185
officials. Later, however, the Court extended these limits to all
public figures.186 The result is that all public figures, whether they are
183. SMOLLA, supra note 169, at 125.
184. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
185. See id. at 283 (requiring “proof of actual malice” before a public official may recover
damages in a libel action).
186. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (holding that “a ‘public figure’
who is not a public official” may only recover damages for defamation “on a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure” from responsible publishing
standards).
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public officials or not, are treated the same. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
187
Inc., the Court held that there are two general types of public
figures: (1) all-purpose public figures (people who have “general fame
or notoriety”); and (2) limited public figures (people who are
involved in a particular controversy).188 For limited public figures, “an
individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
range of issues.”189 Under this approach, the scope of who can become
a public figure is rather broad.
However, there are important reasons why focusing on public
versus private figures does not adequately capture what is of public
versus private concern. First, information about public figures is not
always more important to society than information about private
figures. Indeed, information about private figures can be more
relevant to people’s daily lives and decisions than data about public
figures. For example, many people find it more important to know
that the person babysitting their children has two prior child
molestation convictions than the fact that a celebrity has a foot fetish.
Second, public figures are different from public officials, yet
defamation law makes no distinction. In the context of defamation
law, Frederick Schauer observes that if the purpose of First
Amendment is “protection against a certain danger—a particularly
190
likely form of governmental overreaching,” then it does not make
sense to treat public officials like public figures. Public figures often
do not “have some special access to or influence on the legislative
process that is likely to cause their interests to be overprotected.”191
Similarly, those who view the First Amendment as concerned with
protecting speech about political matters, such as Cass Sunstein, agree
192
that speech about “celebrities often does not involve politics.”
Sunstein concludes that there is no need for the law to “provide
193
special ‘breathing space’ to falsehoods about famous people.”
Schauer and Sunstein’s arguments, made in the context of
defamation law, apply to privacy law as well. Celebrities and other

187. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
188. Id. at 352.
189. Id. at 351.
190. Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 924 (1983).
191. Id. at 928.
192. SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 160.
193. Id. at 161.
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public figures should not be treated the same as public officials,
because the interests behind the disclosure of information about
public figures and public officials are different. Public officials are our
representatives and spokespeople. Information about their finances
and health are generally viewed as being of public concern. A
candidate’s socioeconomic background can shed light on that
candidate’s beliefs, values, and biases. Information about politicians’
health can be relevant to how vigorously they can carry out their
194
duties and whether they can live out a term in office. In contrast,
similar information about a celebrity does not impact our political
choices. Information about celebrities may be of interest or have
entertainment value, but often it serves little other purpose.
Third, not all public officials are the same. Courts often lump
195
public officials into the same category, but there is a big difference
between the nation’s president and a local police officer or a teacher.
The president’s health, for example, is considered by many to be of
public concern. This is hardly true for a bureaucrat, teacher, local
prosecutor, or other minor public official.
Fourth, not all information about public officialslet alone
public figures more generallyis of public concern. For example, it is
hard to contend that the social security numbers of public officials are
of public concern.
In the end, the status of the individual is a factor in helping to
distinguish between what is of public or private concern, but it only
goes so far.
c. The Nature of the Information. A third approach to
distinguishing public from private concerns is to focus on the nature
of the information, categorizing data contributing to democratic selfgovernance as being of public concern. Of course, the issue of what
information assists democratic self-governance is a difficult question.

194. This is not to say that all information about public officials is of public concern. For an
interesting argument that information about public officials’ sex lives is sometimes not of public
concern, see Anita L. Allen, Privacy and the Public Official: Talking About Sex as a Dilemma
for Democracy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (1999).
195. See, e.g., Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1556, 1562 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding,
in a constitutional right to information privacy suit, that the public’s interest in knowing
financial information about all civil service employees, including police and firemen, outweighed
privacy interests); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the
public had a right to know financial information of a wide range of public officials in a
constitutional right to information privacy suit).
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Drawing from Alexander Meiklejohn, many commentators make this
determination by focusing on speech that aids political discussion and
debate. For example, Edward Bloustein contends that newsworthy
speech must be “relevant to the public’s governing purpose,” and he
notes that there is no First Amendment right to “satisfy public
196
curiosity and publish lurid gossip about private lives.” Likewise,
Paul Gewirtz contends: “The freedom of the press protected by the
First Amendment must be seen as primarily about the press’[s]
contribution to democratic self-governance, to public debate, and to
checking the power of the state.”197
However, adopting a Meiklejohnian approach seems far too
restrictive regarding what forms of speech may be of concern to the
public. Such an approach would confine public matters to issues
directly related to politics. But social practices and human behavior
are often highly relevant to how people live their lives and understand
society. The details of other people’s private lives help illuminate
these concerns. According to Volokh, speech about “daily life
matters” is “at least equally worthy” as other forms of speech.198
Speech is not just limited to “ideological” messages.199 Although
focusing exclusively on politics is too narrow, an approach that
classifies all information of interest or entertainment value as public is
too broad. If all such information were of public concern, it would be
difficult to discern what could be private.
One solution is to draw lines based upon the intimacy of the
information. Data about health and sex are private because these
matters are deeply personal, whereas more innocuous information
like names and addresses is not. Embodying this view, the
Restatement notes that “[t]here may be some intimate details of [an
actress’s] life, such as sexual relations, which even [she] is entitled to
200
keep to herself.”

196. Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and
the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 56–57 (1974).
197. Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 172; see also Melville B.
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 962 (1968) (“[S]peech necessary for an effective
and meaningful democratic dialogue by and large does not require references to the intimate
activities of named individuals.”).
198. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1092–93.
199. Id. at 1084.
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 11, § 652D cmt. h.
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The problem with this approach is that often there are strong
privacy interests in relatively innocuous information. For example,
although an address is often not a private piece of information, for
some people it can be quite important to keep their addresses
confidential. Celebrities want to keep their addresses private to
prevent being hounded and harassed by obsessed fans, stalkers, and
paparazzi. Many other people may want their addresses kept secret,
such as victims of stalkers or victims of domestic abuse who are
seeking refuge from their abusers. Witnesses, jurors, or judges in a
criminal case may need to conceal where they live to prevent
retaliation against themselves and their families. In Kallstrom v. City
201
of Columbus, police officers successfully prevented the disclosure of
their home addresses because it could enable the criminals whom
they arrested to seek them out and threaten their families.202 As this
last example illustrates, the privacy of one’s address can be an issue of
safety and security. Another example is an incident in which a man
purchased a woman’s personal information from a database company,
including her work address, then went to her workplace and killed
her.203 Indeed, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act,204 which limits
government disclosures of motor vehicle record information, was
inspired by an incident in which a deranged fan murdered actress
Rebecca Shaeffer outside her home after acquiring Shaeffer’s address
from the Department of Motor Vehicles.205
The “Nuremberg Files” case, Planned Parenthood v. American
206
Coalition of Life Activists, involved a severe safety threat when an
anti-abortion activist group published abortion doctors’ names,
photos, addresses, and descriptions of their cars on an Internet
website. Names of doctors who were murdered were crossed out with
a black line, and the names of wounded doctors were shaded in gray.
The disclosure of this information, often relatively innocuous and not
considered private, was quite an important matter for the doctors,
who feared for their safety and that of their families.207 The doctors
sued and won. Although address information is not sensitive or
intimate, this does not automatically make it public. It is of public or
201. 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998).
202. Id. at 1069.
203. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003).
204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721−25 (2000).
205. Solove, supra note 117, at 1191.
206. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
207. Id. at 1065.
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private concern depending upon the purposes for which people want
to conceal it and the uses that others might make of it.
In sum, as an approach to distinguishing whether information is
of public or private concern, focusing on the inherent nature of
information is unadvisable, because the nature of information is
context specific.
2. Looking to the Law of Evidence: A More Contextual
Approach. If the above approaches cannot appropriately distinguish
between public and private concerns, then how should the law draw
this distinction? The law of evidence is instructive, not necessarily in
its specifics, but in some of its basic ideas. Rules of evidence
determine the admissibility of information based not only on the
information’s content, but also on the circumstances in which it is
gathered, who is disclosing it, and what purpose its disclosure aims to
achieve.
Thus far, the law has often viewed disclosure in black-and-white
fashion. Information is classified as either of public or private
concern, under the assumption that these are qualities that inhere in
208
the information. The law must abandon this way of seeing the public
and private distinction, and instead should focus on the
209
appropriateness of the disclosure in context. Classifying a matter as
of public concern means that it is appropriately disclosed to a
particular audience in a particular situation. A disclosure that may be
appropriate in one public context (an informal gathering among
friends and acquaintances) may not be appropriate in another public
context (a more formal social gathering). Understood this way,
distinguishing between public and private concerns should center on
the relationships in which information is transferred and the uses to
which information is put. By relationships, I refer to the nature of the
one’s relationships with other people, social institutions, and the
208. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The
Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559, 570 (1998) (arguing that being in public
should not extinguish one’s privacy interest).
209. Robert Post astutely points out that we cannot determine whether information is
private “simply by examining the content of the information; we must instead have some notion
of the circumstances surrounding the revelation of that information.” Post, supra note 33, at 980.
It may be “deeply inappropriate” for information to be revealed in a particular manner and time
and to a particular audience. Id. at 981. Building upon these ideas, Paul Schwartz observes:
“Different kinds of ‘outing,’ that is, revelation of otherwise fully or partially hidden aspects of
one’s life, should be prevented before different audiences.” Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy
and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 834–35 (2000).
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government. Personal information is gathered and disseminated
within these relationships, and the propriety of disclosures relates to
the relationships in which they occur. By uses, I refer to the purposes
behind the disclosure. Information is disclosed for a particular reason
or goal. Disclosure occurs through particular uses of information, and
therefore, not all disclosures of information are the same.
An analysis focusing on relationships and uses must make
reference to social norms, since they determine the appropriateness
of a disclosure in a given context. Although a legal standard to
distinguish public and private concerns must be moored in social
norms, the standard does not always need to reflect what people
actually do in practice. Norms are often aspirational. They do not
merely reflect how people actually behave; they reflect how society
thinks people should behave. These aspirational norms govern how
society distinguishes between public and private concerns.
a. Relationships. If the law is to break free from simplistic
attempts to demarcate the public and private spheres, it must begin to
focus on the relationships in which the information is obtained and
disclosed, and then consider the person or entity making the
disclosure and to whom the disclosure is made. There are two
relevant sets of relationships: (1) the original relationships in which
the information is gathered, and (2) the relationships in which the
information is disclosed. The former set of relationships involve the
way the data was gathered. Was it gleaned by a stranger? Was it
leaked by the police? Did a person’s lawyer, doctor, or spiritual
leader betray a confidence? Was the information obtained through
theft or via illegal surveillance? The latter set of relationships involve
the context in which the information is then disclosed. Was it
disclosed on national television? Was it just told to one other person?
To whom was it disclosed? Did the person to whom it was disclosed
have a good reason to know it?
Suppose, for example, the information concerns a husband
having an affair with another woman. Many people would believe
that it is appropriate for the wife’s brother to disclose the affair to the
wife; they might even believe that the brother has a responsibility to
do so. However, suppose the husband’s doctor disclosed the
information to the husband’s employer or to government authorities.
These scenarios are different because there are different norms that
define these relationships. Not all people and entities have the same
obligations in maintaining the confidentiality of information. As a
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matter of policy, there are significant differences regarding the
desirability of certain people receiving the information.
In recognition of this reality, evidence law sometimes links
information to the context in which it was gathered. In legal
proceedings, evidentiary privileges restrict the disclosure of
210
211
communications between attorney and client, priest and penitent,
212
213
husband and wife, and psychotherapist and patient. Often this
information is highly relevant and probative. The law protects
information communicated within these relationships even though it
might be highly newsworthy and relevant to the trial. One might
argue that these are contractual situations, but the law takes special
steps beyond enforcing contractual rights to safeguard these
relationships. Whereas contract law ordinarily cannot protect people
from being compelled to testify in court, evidentiary privileges can. In
this sense, although the information in people’s relationships with
their doctors and lawyers might interest others, evidence law
recognizes the value of protecting that information from disclosure.
These insights from evidence law should be extended to the
treatment of information disclosures in privacy law. Relationships
differ in their level of intimacy, expectations of confidentiality, and
power dynamics. Certain relationships have strong expectations of
confidentiality, while others have weaker ones. For instance, what
people reveal to employers differs from what they tell doctors,
lawyers, religious leaders, and family members. Even within families,
people may reveal different things to spouses, children, and parents.
Certain relationships involve ethical obligations to maintain the
confidentiality of information, and the parties generally know these
obligations. By contrast, the obligations that a friend may have to
maintain another friend’s secrets are less clearly defined, even though
many people would condemn disclosure. Other relationships do not
involve any normative expectations of nondisclosure. Who would
contend that a victim of a crime should not be able to discuss personal
information about the perpetrator?
210. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
211. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.7 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that
the clergy-communicant privilege poses “very few problems in litigation” because it is “so
widely and uniformly recognized”).
212. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 n.5 (1980) (recognizing a “confidential
marital communications privilege”); see also WEISSENBERGER, supra note 211, § 501.6
(discussing spousal privilege).
213. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1996).
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As Anita Allen observes, people are accountable to others even
214
in their private lives. Rarely do people’s actions “concern only
215
themselves.” However, this fact does not mean that one is
accountable to everyone: “Accountability demands concerning
private life may come from one’s government, one’s political
community, one’s employer, one’s family, and even one’s ethnic,
racial, or religious group. Thus, sometimes people are held
accountable, or feel accountable because of who and what they
are.”216 In other words, people are accountable within certain
relationships, but rarely across the board. Assessing whether a
disclosure is appropriate requires analyzing the relationship in which
it occurs.
In many cases, the propriety of the disclosure of information also
depends upon the manner in which it was obtained. Thus far, privacy
law has suffered from too rigid and compartmentalized a focus. The
privacy torts are overly carved up and have fossilized into rigid forms.
Following Warren and Brandeis’s article, courts feverishly created
remedies for privacy harms. In 1939, the first Restatement of Torts
recognized an invasion of privacy tort, but did not distinguish
217
between different types of invasion. Ever since Prosser identified
218
four distinct privacy torts in 1960, the experimentation and growth
of the privacy torts has slowed significantly. Now, each of the torts
has a fairly fixed set of elements, often patterned after those defined
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1977.
Currently, the “public disclosure of private facts” tort focuses
quite heavily on the nature of the information disclosed; the manner
219
in which the information has been obtained is irrelevant. Instead,
for this issue there is a separate tort, intrusion upon seclusion, which
220
remedies “intrusions” upon one’s “solitude or seclusion.” Intrusion
214. ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2003).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 29–30.
217. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939); accord Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The
Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide
Newsworthiness?, 64 IOWA L. REV. 185, 190 (1979).
218. Prosser, supra note 10, at 389.
219. See DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 3:12, at 216 n.61 (1991) (“[U]nlike
intrusion upon seclusion, in public disclosure cases the issue of actionability and the public
interest limitation should not turn on the matter in which the information has been obtained.”)
(internal quotation omitted).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 11, § 652B.
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upon seclusion concentrates on the manner in which information is
gathered; it does not look to the dissemination of the information.
Thus, the privacy torts view the gathering of the information and the
disclosure of information as completely separate matters, ignoring the
221
interaction between these activities.
As Paul Gewirtz argues, rather than looking to the content of the
communication, the law could focus on “whether the original
communication takes place within a protected zone. . . . The press
could be sanctioned for publishing information about conversations
222
within that zone, regardless of content.” Gewirtz’s approach focuses
on how information is obtained. Public and private are not qualities
that inhere in the information itself; rather, information is private if it
exists in a private space. Even if the information is very intimate and
highly embarrassing, it is public when located in a public domain or
obtained via lawful means.
Under the protected zone approach, disclosure is prohibited for
information obtained by breach of confidence, breach of contract,
trespass, theft, or other violation of law. The protected zone approach
223
was at issue in Bartnicki v. Vopper, which involved unlawful
electronic surveillance. In Bartnicki, the president of a teachers’ union
and its chief negotiator were talking on a cell phone when one said:
“If they’re not gonna move for three percent, we’re gonna have to go
to their, their homes . . . . To blow off their front porches, we’ll have
to do some work on those guys.”224 The call was intercepted in
violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of
225
1986, and the person who intercepted the call gave a tape of the call
to a reporter. There was good reason to believe that the reporter
knew that the conversation was obtained illegally. The reporter
broadcast the tape over the radio, and the caller sued him under the
Act, which imposes liability when a person discloses a conversation
“knowing or having reason to know” that it was obtained through an
illegal interception under the Act.226 The Supreme Court held that the
221. See Rodney A. Smolla, supra note 158, at 321 (suggesting that the law of privacy would
be strengthened if “there is an increasing ‘convergence’ between the intrusion and private facts
torts”).
222. Gewirtz, supra note 197, at 154–55.
223. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
224. Id. at 518–19 (omission in original).
225. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 28, 47, and 50 U.S.C.).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2000).
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Act was unconstitutional as applied in this case because “privacy
concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing
227
matters of public importance.”
Paul Gewirtz, disagreeing with the majority’s analysis, argues
that “[p]rivacy is ultimately about our power to choose our audience.
When privacy is invaded, we are compelled to have an audience we
228
do not want.” In Bartnicki, “the two people speaking on their cell
phones did not wish to contribute to a public debate before a public
audience. Their words were taken from them by stealth and put into
public debate against their will.”229
Gewirtz is correct that the Court was wrong to focus on the
nature of the information rather than on how it was gathered.
However, Gewirtz’s focus on “protected zones” is far too broad.
Looking to the “zone” in which people are communicating can be
helpful, but it is an incomplete way to distinguish between speech of
public and private concern. The problem in Bartnicki is not that a
“zone” was invaded or that the parties did not want their
conversation revealed to a public audience. Rather, the ECPA
disclosure restriction at issue in Bartnicki concerns who is doing the
gathering and disclosing of information, and the means of the
information gathering.
The ECPA provision requires scienterthe person disclosing
must know that the information is illegally obtained—and it does not
apply to all information within a “protected zone.” For example, if
one of the parties to a conversation decided to speak about it to
230
others, the ECPA provision would not apply. It applies only when
the information is gathered in a particular mannerthrough
electronic surveillance by a third party. Through this requirement, the
ECPA forces examination of the relationship between the party
gathering the information disclosed and the person to whom the
information pertains. The ECPA provision also requires us to look at
the relationship between the gathering and the disclosure of the
information, in that the person who discloses the information must
227. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514.
228. Gewirtz, supra note 197, at 155.
229. Id. Rodney Smolla characterizes the information gleaned from the illegal wiretap as
“contraband.” Smolla, supra note 132, at 1099.
230. The law has long maintained that when we tell a secret to others, we assume the risk
they will disclose it to others. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1136 (2002) (examining the line of
Supreme Court cases developing this rule).
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have knowledge about its gathering. In short, the ECPA focuses on
relationships among the people who communicate and who disclose
information, not on particular zones in which communication or
disclosure takes place. This provides a good example of the approach
that the law should take in other contexts.
b. Uses. In addition to examining the relationships in which
information is transferred, privacy law must also account for the uses
to which it is put. Again, the rules of evidence provide a helpful
model of how the law can consider the uses of information. For
example, under the hearsay rule, an out-of-court statement cannot be
231
entered into evidence to establish the truth of the matter asserted.
However, it can be admitted as evidence of a person’s state of mind.
As such, the hearsay statement that “Mr. Doe was having an affair” is
impermissible hearsay if used to prove that Mr. Doe was indeed
having an affair, but it may be used to establish the state of mind of
the person making the statement.
A focus on uses means that the law must examine the purpose of
the disclosure, not just the nature of the information disclosed. The
fact that the use of data is acceptable for a newspaper article does not
mean that its use is acceptable in a database sold commercially or in
credit reports. As Justice Powell observed for the Court’s plurality in
Dun & Bradstreet, credit reports deserve less constitutional protection
than other forms of free speech because credit reports are “speech
solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
232
audience.” In other words, credit reports are “low value” speech
because of the purposes for which they are used.
Thus, focusing on uses rebuts Volokh’s argument that all speech,
including the transfer of information by database companies and the
issuance of credit reports by credit reporting agencies, should be
treated similarly. In essence, Volokh would equate these forms of
speaking to disclosing the information in a news story. But as I have
argued, because the uses are profoundly different, distinctions are
possible even when the same information is involved.
Looking at uses yields more productive approaches for grappling
with the question of what information is of public concern. For
example, focusing on the use of identifying information in a media
story often brackets the issue of whether an entire story is of public
231.
232.

FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
471 U.S. 749, 762 (1985).
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concern; this makes it possible instead to examine whether the story
truly needs to identify the parties involved. In other words, the story
itself may be newsworthy, but the identification of the people
involved might not further the story’s purpose. In a number of well233
234
known cases, courts have so held. Barber v. Time, Inc. involved an
article about a woman suffering from a rare disease that caused her to
continue to lose weight, no matter how much she ate. The article was
entitled “Starving Glutton,” and it contained a photograph of the
plaintiff in her hospital bed. The court correctly concluded that
“[w]hile plaintiff’s ailment may have been a matter of some public
interest because unusual, certainly the identity of the person who
suffered this ailment was not.”235
One common argument against using initials or pseudonyms is
236
that it erodes the credibility of an article. For example, in Howard v.
237
Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., the court concluded that the
identities of victims of involuntary sterilization were essential to a
report about abuses by a mental institution because the identities
were needed to “strengthen the accuracy of the public perception of
the merits of the controversy.”238 In Gilbert v. Medical Economics
239
Co., an article about the lack of self-policing in the medical
profession disclosed the identity of a doctor involved in a malpractice
case and revealed her photograph, as well as her psychiatric and
marital problems. The court concluded that the identification of the
plaintiff “strengthen[ed] the impact and credibility of the article” and
eliminated “any impression that the problems raised in the article
[were] remote or hypothetical.”240 Similarly, in Ross v. Midwest

233. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 39–40 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P.
91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
234. 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
235. Id. at 295.
236. Mintz, supra note 23, at 446–47; see, e.g., Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773,
776–77 (Del. 1963) (using the name of the last man subject to corporal punishment in an article
about the use of corporal punishment to deter crime was newsworthy and not an invasion of
privacy); Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 584 P.2d 1310, 1312 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978)
(disclosing the name of a fourteen-year-old kidnapping and sexual assault victim was
newsworthy because it was a matter of public record, and thus not an invasion of privacy); see
also Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 357 (recognizing the argument that editors of an article have
a right to strengthen the force of their evidence by naming names).
237. 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979).
238. Id. at 303.
239. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
240. Id. at 308.
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241
Communications, Inc., the court held that the disclosure of a rape
victim’s identity in an article about the possible innocence of the man
convicted of the rape was of “unique importance to the credibility and
persuasive force of the story.”242
I believe that all these cases were wrongly decided. In each case,
the story could have been told without identifying the plaintiff. The
story in Howard focused on the abuses of the facility; all that the story
required were details of the abuses, not the names of the specific
people involved. The story in Gilbert used the plaintiff as an example
of a larger problem within the medical profession. Given the types of
intimate details revealed about her, there seems to have lacked much
connection between her specific identity and the problem of deficient
self-policing. Finally, the innocence argument in Ross was based on
the similarity of the rape to another rape involving a different alleged
perpetrator. The identity of the victim was not an issue, given that the
story did not focus on any acts of the victim.
In all cases, the courts relied on the argument that identification
enhances the credibility of the story. However, this argument is at
best weak. One might reply that identifying people in news stories is
essential for the public to verify the stories independently. But,
historically, stories of paramount importance have not identified the
critical parties; for example, in exposing Watergate, Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein relied on the well-known pseudonymous source,
“Deep Throat.” Certainly, it affects verifiability when a story does not
identify a party. However, when the journalists protect confidential
sources, they engage in a balancing determination, sacrificing the
public’s ability to verify for the importance of protecting
confidentiality. Public verifiability is not sacrosanct, but can be
outweighed by privacy interests.
Focusing on the use of a piece of information could lead to a
significant change in the way journalists report certain stories.
However, such an approach is not without precedent. Journalists
generally do not include the names of rape victims or whistleblowers
in their stories. On television, the media sometimes obscures the faces
of particular people in video footage. With minimal effort, the media
can report stories and also protect privacy.
The identification approach discussed above helps illuminate
perhaps the most important First Amendment case involving

241.
242.

870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 274.
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243
disclosure protections—Florida Star v. B.J.F. In Florida Star, a
newspaper published the name of a rape victim obtained from a
public police report. The victim, who began to receive threatening
telephone calls, had to move to a new address and undergo
psychological treatment. She sued and prevailed under a theory that
the newspaper was negligent per se because it violated a Florida law
restricting the widespread disclosure of rape victims’ names.244
However, the Court struck down the verdict, applying strict scrutiny
245
under the First Amendment.
Many have read Florida Star as a broad indication that
restrictions on the disclosure of true information are
246
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, this case can be read very narrowly.
The Court suggested that the Florida statute was far too broad.247 The
statute applied “regardless of whether the identity of the victim is
already known throughout the community; whether the victim has
voluntarily called public attention to the offense; or whether the
identity of the victim [had] otherwise become a reasonable subject of
public concern.”248 The law focused only on the nature of the
information, rather than on whether each particular use of a rape
victim’s name in a specific context would be of public or private
concern. Florida Star can be construed to suggest that a law adopting

243. 491 U.S. 524 (1989)
244. The law provided: “No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be
printed, published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address,
or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense within this chapter.”
FLA. STAT. ch. 794.03 (1987).
245. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
246. See, e.g., id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the Court has all but nullified
the public disclosure tort); Edelman, supra note 57, at 1207 (“The Court paid lip service to the
possibility that a private-fact plaintiff may recover in some cases, but its decisions leave little
hope for vindication of such a plaintiff’s rights.”); Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Note, Resurrecting a
Sunken Ship: An Analysis of Current Judicial Attitudes Toward Public Disclosure Claims, 38 SW.
L.J. 1151, 1184 (1985) (stating the public disclosure tort has “become a phantom tort”); Joseph
Elford, Note, Trafficking in Stolen Information: A “Hierarchy of Rights” Approach to the
Private Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727, 729 (1995) (arguing that the public disclosure tort is “on
the verge of collapsing under the weight of the First Amendment”); Jacqueline K. Rolfs, Note,
The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 1107, 1128 (“Given the narrow class of information that fulfills the Florida Star
requirements, the tort can no longer be an effective tool for protecting individual privacy.”);
Lorelei Van Wey, Note, Private Facts Tort: The End Is Here, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 300 (1991)
(stating that the public disclosure tort “has been driven to near extinction”).
247. In the lower court, the plaintiff did not recover directly under the statute. Rather, the
court held the newspaper negligent per se. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528–29.
248. Id. at 539.
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a less categorical approach—by addressing the use of the identifying
data more contextually—might not be subject to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment.
Not identifying persons involved in a story can resolve many of
the tensions between privacy and free speech. Human interest stories
can still be told while at the same time preserving the privacy of the
individuals involved. The identification approach, however, will not
work for all situations. In particular, when a story points out private
information about a public figure, identifying the person involved is
what gives the story its focus. These stories are not written to describe
a unique situation or set of events, but are often written to inform
readers about particular public figures. The question then becomes
whether the story, as a whole, is of public concern.
249
For example, in Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Company,
Oliver Sipple foiled an attempt to assassinate President Ford when
Ford was visiting San Francisco. The San Francisco Chronicle
published an article outing Sipple as gay. Sipple sued under the public
disclosure tort but the court rejected his claim, in part because the
story was newsworthy. The court articulated two rationales: “to dispel
the false public opinion that gays were timid, weak and unheroic
figures and to raise the equally important political question whether
the President of the United States entertained a discriminatory
attitude or bias against a minority group such as homosexuals.”250 If
Sipple had not been identified to the public before the Chronicle’s
article, then the identification rule would suggest that the story could
have simply not mentioned Sipple’s name. But given that it was
already known that Sipple was the one who saved Ford, protecting his
identity would not have given him much meaningful privacy
protection. Here, and with stories that involve public figures or
limited public figures, the analysis must focus on the entire news
story.
With regard to Sipple’s story, Gewirtz contends that it was not
newsworthy: “Given the intensely personal nature of Sipple’s sexual
identity and the care many homosexuals take to limit general
knowledge about that identity, and given that Sipple did not seek
notoriety, this asserted connection between the private fact and
‘political considerations’ was simply too weak to warrant the

249. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
250. Id. at 670.
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251
Chronicle’s disclosure.” I disagree. My conclusion that the story is
newsworthy is not based on an argument that Sipple had to be outed
in order to promote better social images of gays. It is highly
speculative and rather unlikely that outing one person could alter
perceptions about gays.252 Rather, the story was newsworthy because
it illuminated the president’s potential prejudice. President Ford
never called Sipple to thank him; nor did the president send Sipple a
telegram. The article suggested that this “might not be just an
253
oversight.” What made the story newsworthy was not Sipple so
much as President Ford. Pointing out the president’s highly unusual
behavior in failing to thank the person who saved his life, and raising
the hypothesis that the omission was related to Sipple’s
homosexuality, involved an issue that is deeply connected to the
political sphere. Information concerning the biases of public officials
is an important political issue. Although speech of public concern is
not necessarily limited to the sphere of politics, information used to
address political issues will frequently be of public concern.
I reach my conclusion about Sipple by focusing on the use of the
information. I do not argue that it would have been appropriate to
disclose Sipple’s sexual orientation merely to furnish a colorful story
about the intriguing figure who rescued the president. But using the
information is very appropriate when revealing details about the
president’s attitudes and prejudices. Even though the disclosure is the
same in both instances, the use of the information is very different.254
One might reply that under an approach that focuses on uses, the
media can simply rewrite articles so as to better connect the use of the
information to a political purpose. This is certainly true, but doing so
would still require the media to be more thoughtful about how a story
contributes to matters of public concern. The media would be forced
to think about alternative ways of telling the story. This might be a
relatively modest development, but it would force the media to pay
attention to some of the problems that it is creating, which alone
might amount to a big first step.

251. Gewirtz, supra note 197, at 181.
252. See infra Part II(A)(3).
253. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666 n.1.
254. See John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 102 YALE L.J.
747, 776 (1992) (arguing that outing to establish a person as a gay role model should be
outweighed by privacy rights, whereas outing to point out the hypocrisy of public officials
should be permitted).
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In sum, evidence law focuses on the purpose for which
information is used and the relevance of particular information to
achieve permissible uses. This analysis should be extended to the task
of distinguishing between public and private concerns. The terms
“public concern” and “private concern” do not denote certain
properties of particular types of information. Rather, they are a
shorthand way of describing whether a disclosure is appropriate in a
given situation. Thus, determinations of whether disclosure is
appropriate should focus on the relationship in which the information
is transferred. Certain types of relationships have particular
normative expectations, and each type of relationship has different
degrees of accountability. In addition to focusing on these
relationships, the law must focus on how information gathered is
used. Not all uses are the same. To assess whether the law should
protect against certain disclosures, the law should examine the
specific relationships and uses of the information, not whether the
information fits into a category in the abstract.
In many instances, the contentious debate about whether a
particular article raises matters of public or private concern can be
sidestepped by examining whether the identifying information at
issue contributes to the purpose of the article. This solution does not
work in all instances, but it is an example of how certain debates can
be shifted in more fruitful directions. Nevertheless, many disclosures
require tackling head-on the question of whether the entire story is of
public concern. This determination is bound to be messy, because
there is no meaningful way to make it in a categorical fashion. As
discussed throughout this Section, attempts to simplify the analysis
lead to failure. Faced with this reality, critics such as Volokh contend
that the free speech costs from a messy approach are far greater than
the benefits. In the next Section, I attempt to answer this powerful
contention.
3. The Problem of Hyper-Contextualism. A major problem with
adopting a more contextual approach to distinguishing between
public and private concerns is that the analysis can become too
contextual. Without some guiding principles, the analysis can readily
become a confusing and contradictory morass in which the central
criteria remain unarticulated. For example, for the tort of public
disclosure, Randall Bezanson argues that “standards of taste or
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propriety are simply unascertainable on a societal level” because
255
society is “too pluralistic and culturally diverse.” Likewise, Diane
Zimmerman contends that privacy is “rich in symbolic value but has
256
little particularized meaning.” There is a great difficulty in arriving
at any social consensus on privacy: “It is difficult to achieve stable and
serious agreement on the sort of personal information that can readily
be foregone, and which disclosures are therefore ‘unreasonable.’”257
Eugene Volokh contends that standards such as “lack of legitimate
public concern” are “so vague and potentially so broad that accepting
them may jeopardize a good deal of speech that ought to be
protected.”258 Likewise, Thomas Emerson argues that defining
“newsworthy” as involving matters of “public interest” is quite
“vague” because it fails to determine “what is or what ought to be a
matter of public interest.”259 If social norms about the propriety of
disclosures are too diffuse and contestable, then a law protecting
against “improper” disclosures may become too unpredictable or
even unworkable.
I do not share this skepticism about finding a sufficient degree of
social consensus on privacy. Social consensus can and does develop
on a number of specific matters, such as the lack of legitimate public
260
interest in nude pictures of unwilling private individuals. However,
in all but the most extreme cases, it will be difficult to find a social
consensus. In our pluralistic society, few values will have the level of
consensus that scholars like Volokh demand. Nevertheless, the law
does not simply reflect social values; it also shapes them, and over
time it can help build some degree of social consensus. When
members of society disagree, the law forces society to weigh
competing values. Prohibiting the law from distinguishing between
matters of public and private concern will not result in neutrality but
in certain values prevailing over others. The balance established in
the absence of law’s involvement may not be the most beneficial
to society.

255. Bezanson, supra note 27, at 1172.
256. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Musings on a Famous Law Review Article: The Shadow
of Substance, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 826 (1991).
257. Id.
258. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1116.
259. EMERSON, supra note 35, at 553.
260. See, e.g., Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and First Amendment
Rights in Public Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1385, 1411 (1976) (“[S]ociety defines by
convention some of the areas considered most private.”).
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As discussed earlier, the media does not necessarily develop
norms that are socially optimal, and neither do database marketers
and credit reporting agencies. Thus, there are benefits to allowing
judges and juries to decide cases in a contextual manner. Through
precedent, which serves to limit the degree of variation and
inconsistency in cases, judicial involvement enables the growth and
development of standards for weighing conflicting and contested
values. Certainly, juries do cause some variation. However, over time,
261
judges define parameters and reach points of widespread consensus.
Similar consensus is developing about privacy, although the tort of
public disclosure is much younger than most other torts. Warren and
Brandeis recognized this problem in their article, and they responded:
There are of course difficulties in applying such a rule; but they are
inherent in the subject-matter, and are certainly no greater than
those which exist in many other branches of the law,—for instance,
in that large class of cases in which the reasonableness or
262
unreasonableness of an act is made the test of liability.

Therefore, the existence of a complex standard as opposed to a clear
rule is not necessarily a problem. An extensive literature discusses the
benefits of vague standards over clear rules, of “muddy” versus
263
“crystalline” law.
It is true, however, that a contextual approach toward
distinguishing public and private concerns will have some chilling
effects on speech. While Volokh contends that the chilling effects will
be great and that the privacy interests are relatively unimportant, I
have argued that privacy is too important to ignore because it strongly
promotes the interests justifying free speech. Volokh argues that the
privacy arguments are overblown because they often assume a
situation in which privacy is completely annihilated: “Claims about

261. Such a consensus is beginning to be shaped in the law of editorial judgment. See
Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754 (1999).
262. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 214.
263. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information
Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801, 1878 (2003) (“[Vague] propertybased entitlements . . . are a promising approach that should have the happy consequence of
establishing courts as guardians of information privacy.”); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of
Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 191 (2002) (“[F]aith and hope, and
not a little charity, are the hidden message, the underlying virtue of the vagueness in takings
doctrine.”); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 610
(1988) (“[Vague] rhetoric suggests that we treat even those to whom we have no real connection
with the kind of engagement that we normally reserve for friends and partners.”).
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what would happen if privacy were totally destroyed tell us nothing
264
about which particular privacy rules . . . are indispensable.”
Although arguments based on the total destruction of privacy are
sometimes made, they are often ineffective because they are too
abstract and speculative. These arguments aim to shock by revealing
the bleak bottom of the slippery slope. Therefore, on this point, I
agree with Volokhbut only to a certain extent. As Volokh argues in
a recent article about slippery slope arguments: “We can’t just dismiss
slippery slope arguments as illogical or paranoid, though we can’t
uncritically accept them, either.”265 He notes that certain policy
decisions can alter attitudes, “leading [people] to accept proposals
266
that they would have rejected before.” One of the rationales for
protecting privacy is to prevent slipping down the slope to a world in
which people expect less privacy, and privacy continues to evaporate
until little remains. This threat need not be exaggerated, but it should
not be ignored.
Indeed, the same type of argument is sometimes made about free
speech: that a relatively modest limitation on free speech will lead
down the slippery slope to greater restrictions. Indeed, Volokh
expresses concern over the “possible downstream effects” of privacy
restrictions on disclosure, arguing that making exceptions for privacy
“will be a powerful precedent for those other restraints and for still
267
more that might be proposed in the future.” This is the danger of
the slippery slopeif true statements about people can be restricted,
what will stop other restrictions?268
Nevertheless, Volokh has not demonstrated that disclosure
protections actually lead to diminished protection for free speech in
other areas. At best, Volokh’s argument is speculative, which in and
of itself is not a basis to reject it. Many disclosure protections,
however, are not new. The public disclosure tort has existed for much
of the twentieth century, and it has not cowed the media. Thus, it
does not appear at this point that disclosure protections have led to
further speech restrictions.

264. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1111.
265. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1136
(2003) (footnote omitted).
266. Id. at 1036.
267. Id. at 1051.
268. Id. at 1114.
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The distinction between public and private concerns cannot
escape some fuzziness, but there are different levels of fuzziness:
fuzziness throughout, and fuzziness at the margins. In other words, as
with any distinction, there are bound to be some black-and-white
areas and some gray areas. The critical question is not whether or not
there is some gray, but where the gray zone is located and how large it
is. The danger of gray spots is that there will be chilling effects around
these places. Robert O’Neil points out that the fear and cost of
litigation may result in the media being overly cautious and failing to
269
report on certain important stories.
Under my approach, not all stories will have the same risks of
being chilled. Human interest stories might be chilled, but, in most
cases, the only chilling will be of specific identifying informationthe
names of the people involved. In other words, the chilling effect
argument is often overbroad. The chilling effect argument achieves its
power by envisioning the media inhibited in its role of watchdog and
protector of democracy. But the watchdog character of the press is
unlikely to be chilled. There are many stories that most people can
readily agree are of public concern, such as stories about political
elections, health care policy, foreign affairs, the war on terrorism, and
so on. It is the media’s dark underbelly—reporting on the latest
celebrity scandal—that will be in the gray zone and might be chilled.
And this consequence is not as terrible as the free speech critique
proponents make it out to be. Why should the media be allowed to do
whatever it wants, no matter how socially detrimental or harmful to
individuals, no matter how great the costs to others in society, no
matter how few the benefits produced? The media should internalize
some of the costs that it imposes on others in making its product.
Sadly, the media have often become more of a watchdog to celebrities
than to the government.
My argument for a contextual approach to distinguishing public
from private is not one that always prefers a resolution by judges or
juries. Although legislatures cannot be quite as contextual, they can
still pass laws that focus on the relationships surrounding the
information—how it is obtained, disclosed, and used. There are many

269. See O’NEIL, supra note 10, at 167 (“[T]he potential legal risks outweighed whatever
benefit might result from broadcasting such material.”); see also BRUCE W. SANFORD, DON’T
SHOOT THE MESSENGER: HOW OUR GROWING HATRED OF THE MEDIA THREATENS FREE
SPEECH FOR ALL OF US 1–10 (1999) (recounting examples of corporations and celebrities’ suing
to restrict stories and the media’s “caving” in).
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circumstances in which the privacy torts are not adequate to protect
privacy, as is the case with the use of personal information in
computer databases. Elsewhere, I argue that the privacy torts are not
effective in grappling with the growing collection and use of personal
data in computer databases because the torts focus on individual
270
cases when the problems of databases are more systemic. Statutory
law works best in many circumstances that raise systemic problems.
As Julie Cohen argues: “[I]t is becoming increasingly clear that the
common law invasion of privacy torts will not help to contain the
destruction of informational privacy.”271
Privacy law is still relatively young. It has not simmered for
centuries like much of tort law or criminal law. An extensive amount
of work must be done to mature this area of law, and prudence
counsels avoiding the temptation to reach for easy bright-line rules.
There is no easy bright-line approach to resolving how public and
private concerns can be distinguished. I have demonstrated that
approaches attempting to do so have failed. Despite the impossibility
of making a tidy distinction, a distinction is still possible—although it
will be messy at times. My suggestion to focus on relationships and
uses aims to reshape the debate about how to draw this distinction.
Although my approach will not bring easy answers, I hope it will
prevent the law from reaching faulty ones. In any event, having the
debate over public and private speech is critically important to
society. As I have demonstrated in Section B, and as I endeavor to
show in Part II, privacy is too important a social value to be sacrificed
for greater clarity and certainty in First Amendment doctrine.
D. Reassessing the Free Speech Critique
Broadly, my purpose has been to argue against Volokh’s
approach of applying strict scrutiny to most privacy protections.272
Volokh’s approach has the virtue of simplicity; it is much less messy,
and it has less potential to chill speech than the alternative approach I
have sketched. Nevertheless, despite these virtues of Volokh’s
270. Solove, supra note 5, at 1434–35; see also Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 393, 441–42 (2002) (“Although individual bits of data in the consumer profile
are as inconclusive as those in Shibley, their aggregation and juxtaposition represent a
qualitatively different kind of threat to privacy.”).
271. Cohen, supra note 141, at 2043.
272. Rodney Smolla makes an interesting argument when he contends that tying disclosure
restrictions to content “arguably enhances First Amendment values more than it detracts from
them, by employing greater precision in regulation.” Smolla, supra note 132, at 1151–52.
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approach, and despite the potential for messiness and chilling effects
in my approach, the case for privacy is strong. The reason is that, on
balance, privacy furthers many of the same interests that free speech
does.
Debates about free speech are sometimes cast in absolutes.
However, not all speech is of equal value, nor is speech a value
superior to all others. It is imperative to balance. Balancing means
assessing the value of particular forms of speech against their costs. I
have argued that speech about private matters should be given less
weight than speech about public matters. The determination of what
is public and what is private should not rest with the media, for this
would leave the decision in the hands of decisionmakers who can be
flawed and self-interested. Likewise, focusing on the status of the
individual (public versus private figures) as well as looking at the
nature of the information disclosed both fail to account adequately
for context. These approaches see disclosure as all or nothing. Either
information is of private concern and remains wholly secret, or it is of
public concern and can be released to the world for whatever reason.
But this all-or-nothing approach is not very workable in an age when
information has so many uses and can be disseminated and stored so
easily. It is wiser to avoid speaking of information as if it is private or
is public. Often, the same piece of information is of both private
concern and public concern—it just depends upon the context. And
by “context,” I mean the relationships in which information is
transferred and the uses to which information is put. Information is
typically generated and recorded for a particular reason. It originally
exists in particular relationships, with particular meanings and
expectations of dissemination and use. Disclosures take information
beyond these initial contexts, moving it into new contexts and new
relationships, for new purposes. The law must focus on uses of
information, not on categorizing a particular piece of information as
public or private. Different uses of the same piece of information
have different benefits and different costs. The law of evidence
readily recognizes this reality; the law of privacy could benefit from a
similar approach.
Under the theories supporting the value of free speech discussed
above, disclosure protections generally fare well in the balance. There
are many good reasons why society values free speech and wishes to
protect it. Instrumentally, free speech is valuable because it promotes
autonomy, democracy, and the quest for the truth. But these interests
can also be served by protecting privacy, and a balance between free
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speech and privacy might achieve these interests more effectively
than merely protecting speech at all costs.
Nevertheless, the importance of privacy must be better
articulated. As discussed earlier in this Section, privacy promotes
First Amendment interests and can protect free speech. But it has
other benefits, which I discuss in Part II.
II. THE JUDGMENT AND TRUST CRITIQUE
The free speech critique focuses on a particular set of values for
the free flow of information. Another critique of disclosure
restrictions, which I call the “judgment and trust critique,” locates the
value of free flow of information in the way it contributes to people’s
ability to judge others, place trust in others, and educate themselves
about society. Under the judgment and trust critique, protections
against disclosure inhibit a person’s ability to assess other people’s
reputations and make accurate judgments about them.
According to Judge Richard Posner, protection against
disclosure impedes people’s ability to make judgments about other
people. He views the central issue in privacy law as “whether a person
273
should have a right to conceal discreditable facts about himself.”
“The economist sees a parallel to the efforts of sellers to conceal
defects in their products.”274 Posner views privacy as a form of selfinterested economic behaviorit lets people conceal harmful facts
275
about themselves for their own gain. Specifically he observes that
“when people today decry lack of privacy, what they want, I think, is
mainly something quite different from seclusion: they want more
power to conceal information about themselves that others might use
to their disadvantage.”276 A person constructs a public self to display
to the world, and then sells this self by “using it to make
advantageous transactions in employment and marriage markets and,
more generally, in the market for human relationships whether of a
personal or of a commercial character.”277 Likewise, Richard Epstein

273. POSNER, supra note 30, at 46.
274. Id.
275. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 234 (1981) (people “want to
manipulate the world around them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves.”).
276. Id. at 271.
277. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 532 (1995).
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contends that “the plea for privacy is often a plea for the right to
278
misrepresent one’s self to the rest of the world.”
The judgment and trust critique also assumes that more
disclosure will generally yield more truth. In other words, more
information about a person will make one’s judgment about that
person more accurate. For example, when a person knows about the
defects in a product, the person is able to value that product more
accurately. As with all products, Posner argues, more truthful
information enables more informed decisions. “Prying enables one to
form a more accurate picture of a friend or colleague, and the
knowledge gained is useful in social or professional dealings with
279
him.” Under Posner’s view, much secrecy is deception:
We would think it wrong (and inefficient) if the law permitted a
seller in hawking his wares to make false or incomplete
representations of their quality. But people “sell” themselves as well
as their goods by professing high standards of behavior to induce
others to engage in advantageous social or business dealings with
them, while concealing facts that these acquaintances need in order
280
to evaluate their character.

Thus, according to Posner, privacy can be a form of deception which
benefits the individual at the expense of many others.
There is certainly a strong social value in enabling people to
make accurate assessments of others. According to sociologist Steven
Nock, “[t]rust and the ability to take others at their word are basic
281
ingredients in social order.” People often establish trust based on a
person’s reputation, which is “a shared, or collective, perception
282
about a person.” Today, most people no longer live in small towns
where they know personally nearly everyone in their lives. Instead,
people tend to live in large communities with highly mobile
populations, in which many neighbors are strangers.283 Privacy inhibits
the establishing of trust because privacy “makes it difficult to know
others’ reputations,” and knowing reputations is a prerequisite to

278.
279.
280.
281.

Epstein, supra note 30, at 12.
POSNER, supra note 275, at 232.
Id. at 233.
STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN
AMERICA 1 (1993).
282. Id. at 2.
283. See id. at 11–12 (discussing the increase in strangers, and therefore of privacy, as a
function of urbanization and social mobility).
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284
trusting strangers. We place our safety in the hands of other people.
We entrust others with our finances, our deepest secrets, and the care
of our children. Disclosures of personal data provide the information
necessary to determine whether or not to trust other people.
Even when information is not helpful in judging the particular
people with whom one interacts, gossip about people’s private lives
can serve an educative function, enabling people to learn about the
lifestyles of others. Because private lives play an important role in
daily existence, learning about the private sphere is very valuable.
Contrary to Warren and Brandeis’ dismissal of gossip as being idle
and trivial, Diane Zimmerman contends that gossip has a high social
value: “By providing people with a way to learn about social groups to
which they do not belong, gossip increases intimacy and a sense of
285
community among disparate individuals and groups.” Zimmerman’s
argument takes the judgment and trust critique a step beyond one’s
immediate circle. By her account, disclosure not only helps people to
judge those with whom they associate, but also facilitates a more
general understanding of human nature.
In this Part, I respond to the judgment and trust critique. First, I
contend that disclosure often does not improve judgment. Personal
information taken out of context can lead to hasty and unfair
judgments that do not necessarily lead to more truth about a person’s
character. Disclosure protections also safeguard against certain
irrational judgments. Additionally, disclosure protections guard
against rational judgments that society may desire to curtail.
Regarding the educative function of gossip, I contend that its value is
thin; to whatever extent gossip can educate people about society, less
harmful alternatives exist to achieve the same end. I then respond to
two repliesthat disclosure protections to further these ends are
paternalistic, and that they promote too much dissonance between
public and private identities.
Second, I argue that even if a disclosure of private information
improves the accuracy of judgments, it can still be outweighed by
other social interests, such as promoting the ability to grow and to
reform. In responding to the judgment and trust critique, I point out
that the critique often improperly focuses on information in the
abstract, without attending to its purpose or potential use. I argue that
categorical judgments are often flawed; it is more fruitful to focus on

284.
285.

Id. at 124.
Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 333–34.
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how the information will be used. Refashioning the inquiry in this
way reveals that many disclosures are far too broad for their
purposes, and that disclosure regulations can help to achieve a better
tailoring between disclosures and the sometimes worthy ends for
which they are made.
A. Less is More?
The judgment and trust critique has a strong intuitive
persuasiveness. This is because most people would generally agree
that more information is preferable to less. Most people would also
agree that judgments about others are generally enhanced and
improved by more information. More disclosure, however, may not
necessarily lead to more accurate judgments about others. In this
Section, I explain that the disclosure of private information can often
lead to misjudgment, and I argue that the law can and should
influence the way people judge each other.
1. Judging Out of Context. Posner analogizes discreditable
private information about people to unfavorable information about
commodities. However, the “truth” about a person is much more
difficult to ascertain than the truth about a product or thing. People
are far more complex than products. Knowing certain information
can distort one’s judgment of another rather than increase its
accuracy.
Judging other people is a very important ability. People
constantly asses those around them, which facilitates interpersonal
interaction, trust, and comprehension. But people often judge quickly
because of time constraints. Jeffrey Rosen astutely points out that
people have short attention spans and will likely not judge other
people fairly: “Privacy protects us from being misdefined and judged
out of context in a world of short attention spans, a world in which
286
information can easily be confused with knowledge.” Rosen further
argues:
When intimate personal information circulates among a small group
of people who know us well, its significance can be weighed against
other aspects of our personality and character. By contrast, when
intimate information is removed from its original context and

286. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 8 (2000).
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revealed to strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the
basis of our most embarrassing, and therefore most memorable,
287
tastes and preferences.

Our perception of the world is riddled with gaps. William Gass,
writing about literature, observes:
Characters in fiction are mostly empty canvas. I have known many
who have passed through their stories without noses, or heads to
hold them; others have lacked bodies altogether, exercised no
natural functions, possessed some thoughts, a few emotions, but no
psychologies, and apparently made love without the necessary
288
organs.

Similarly, the narratives about others that people construct are often
filled with “empty canvas”—imagination must fill in the gaps.
Human judgment
is
imperfect,
unfair,
and
often
uncompromising. People often condemn others on partial
information. Indeed, necessity demands hasty judgment. If it is true
that human judgment is generally hampered by short attention spans
and incomplete information, why should the law pay special attention
to misjudgment based on private rather than public information?
Lawrence Lessig agrees with Rosen that privacy protects people
“from damaging conclusions drawn from misunderstood information”
due to the fact that people have a limited attention span for learning
289
the complete story. But Lessig criticizes Rosen’s argument because
the problem of limited attention spans “is more general than privacy.
Privacy could be one solution to a more general failing of the
information market. But it will not, on its own, solve this problem
with the information market.”290 Robert Post also critiques Rosen on
similar grounds, arguing that the problem of misunderstanding is not
really a privacy problem because misunderstanding can occur with
291
both private and public information. Why is protecting private
information special?
Lessig and Post are correct that misunderstanding can occur in
many ways, not exclusively through revelation of private information.
287. Id. As Julie Cohen observes: “The harms of this rush to judgment . . . may undermine
liberal individualism (as Rosen argues), but they are products of it as well.” Cohen, supra note
141, at 2030.
288. WILLIAM H. GASS, FICTION AND THE FIGURES OF LIFE 45 (1979).
289. Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063, 2065 (2001).
290. Id. at 2066.
291. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087–89 (2001).
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Just because this is so, however, need not tarnish Rosen’s insight.
Much misunderstanding occurs because of the disclosure of private
information, and therefore, privacy is an important way of protecting
against misunderstanding. It may not be the exclusive way to
safeguard being judged out of context, but there are many reasons
why the disclosure of private information is particularly susceptible to
misunderstanding.
An additional way that privacy laws have mitigated the problem
of judging out of context is by helping people to mediate among the
different types of roles they must play in society. Drawing from the
292
work of sociologist Erving Goffman, Alan Westin argues that
individuals need to control information about the self because they
have conflicting roles to play in society and must present different
selves at different times:
Each person is aware of the gap between what he wants to be and
what he actually is, between what the world sees of him and what he
knows to be his much more complex reality. . . . Every individual
lives behind a mask in this manner; indeed, the first etymological
meaning of the word “person” was “mask,” indicating both the
conscious and expressive presentation of the self to a social
audience. If this mask is torn off and the individual’s real self bared
to a world in which everyone else still wears his mask and believes in
masked performances, the individual can be seared by the hot light
293
of selective, forced exposure.

Different roles have different norms about how to relate to others.294
For example, parents present themselves as role models to their
children, and society deems it quite appropriate for parents to portray
themselves in this idealized manner.
Each role enables people to display different aspects of
themselves. People even play roles in which they seem improperly
cast, hoping to grow into the part. One plays a role until it fits,
becoming transformed in the process. Selfhood is a process of growth
and development, not a fixed state of being.
The self has public and private dimensions. These two modes of
existence can be vastly dissimilar, requiring different behaviors and
self-expression. No one can be purely public or purely private. As

292.
293.
294.

ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
WESTIN, supra note 104, at 33; see also Karas, supra note 270, at 428–29.
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 922 (1996).
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novelist Milan Kundera observes, “[a]ny man who was the same in
both public and intimate life would be a monster. He would be
without spontaneity in his private life and without responsibility in his
295
public life.”
Public roles require the repression of private aims to meet the
296
People groom themselves and clothe
expectations of others.
themselves before emerging in public, and when playing public roles
they are careful in how they foster impressions. In private roles, the
individual expresses aspects of the self that are often inappropriate in
public roles.297 In private, people are generally more relaxed and at
ease. As Kundera notes: “[I]n private, a person says all sorts of things,
slurs friends, uses coarse language, acts silly, tells dirty jokes, repeats
himself, makes a companion laugh by shocking him with outrageous
talk, floats heretical ideas he’d never admit to in public, and
so forth.”298
There is a popular myth that the public self is not as real or
genuine as the private self, but this is not necessarily the case. Indeed,
to the ancient Greeks, according to Hannah Arendt, public life was
299
more representative of one’s authentic self than life in private. I
posit that neither the public nor private self represents the true self;
these are just dimensions in a very complex multifaceted personality,
one that is shaped by the roles a person plays. People express
different sides of their personalities in different relationships and
contexts.
If one accepts this account of selfhood, then it follows that
disclosures about people in one context will not necessarily reveal
who they “truly” are or enable more accurate assessments of their
character. Instead, these disclosures can often be jarring, for they
display people out of the particular context in which others may know
them. For example, an introverted and conservative person may have
a fantasy life on the Internet, where she becomes outgoing, bold, and
experimental. Suppose she participates in a chatroom on bondage.
Does this information, when disclosed to her coworkers and friends,
enable them to better assess who she really is as a person? One could
295. Roth, In Defense of Intimacy: Milan Kundera's Private Lives, THE VILLAGE VOICE,
June 26, 1984, at 42, col. 1.
296. JOSEPH BENSMAN & ROBERT LILIENFELD, BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: LOST
BOUNDARIES OF THE SELF 174 (1979).
297. Id. at 49.
298. MILAN KUNDERA, TESTAMENTS BETRAYED 260–61 (1995).
299. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22–24 (1958).

SOLOVE.DOC

2003]

07/07/04 1:38 PM

THE VIRTUES OF KNOWING LESS

1039

argue that any incremental information enhances one’s ability to
assess others. Seeing people across contexts can lead to a more
complete overall assessment of character. However, isolated
information, often constituting only part of a very complicated reality,
may lead to hasty condemnation.
Disclosures of private information at the initial stages of
acquaintance can be even more distorting. According to Goffman,
people need time to establish relationships with others before
300
revealing secrets. Immediate honesty is costly. With time to gain
familiarity with an individual, people are better able to process
301
information, see the whole person, and weigh secrets in context.
Rosen argues that apprehensiveness about misjudgment based
on private information can impede people’s ability to form intimate
relationships:
If individuals cannot form relationships of trust without fear that
their confidences will be betrayed, the uncertainty about whether or
not their most intimate moments are being recorded for future
exposure will make intimacy impossible; and without intimacy, there
will be no opportunity to develop the autonomous, inner-directed
302
self that defies social expectations rather than conforms to them.

In other words, the disclosure of private information can corrode our
private roles.
There is another reason for protecting against the disclosure of
private information: it hinders not only private roles but public roles
as well. Everyone must cope with the fragility of reputation, on which
the ability to function in society delicately hangs. All who value their
reputations care about how others judge them. Reputation is
especially important in one’s public roles, because these roles shape
one’s career, relationship with much of society, participation in
political life, and financial well-being. The reality is that people lack
much control over how they are judged. One is constantly at the
mercy of others—a precarious position to be in. However, managing
disclosures about one’s private life is an even greater and more
difficult burden, making reputation all the more vulnerable.

300. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 96
(1963).
301. Id.
302. Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117, 2123–24
(2001).
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Society accepts that public reputations will be groomed to some
degree. People are often careful to keep their public reputations free
of dirt and grime. Because it is possible to separate out certain aspects
of life as private, and because people can prevent information about
their private lives from reaching the public, people can exercise some
amount of control over how others judge them in public. Society
protects privacy because it wants to provide individuals with some
degree of influence over how they are judged in the public arena.
Although no one is secure from all misjudgment, privacy also allows
people to foster certain contexts in which they are free from having to
worry about public misjudgment.
Why is it important to protect the way one is judged? I posit that
such protections are important because concerns about being
misjudged and having one’s reputations poisoned can make people
profoundly unfree, shackling them to their perceptions of how they
will be perceived. Of course, people manufacture their public
reputations quite a bit. Posner would say that by protecting privacy,
society is enabling people to promote misjudgment in ways that are
favorable to privacy-seekers and detrimental to those who would seek
to judge them. However, the degree of control that privacy affords
people over how others judge them brings important benefits—it
helps them to feel more confident in the public sphere, participate in
public activities more freely, and play private roles with more gusto.
Being judged by others is an inescapable reality of living in society. It
can be helpful and instructive, for the way we are judged by others
helps us shape our identities and can make us aware of our identities,
good qualities, and flaws. But judgment can also become oppressive
and suffocating, a danger which privacy mitigates.
The law protects against disclosures of private information
because society believes that such information is not appropriate for
making public judgments about people. Without making a distinction
between public and private information, it is hard to think of a viable
way to give people any limited control over how others judge them. If
the law protected against the disclosure of all information that could
lead to judging out of context, it would have to limit the disclosure of
practically all personal information. That clearly is unworkable, so the
law recognizes limited contexts (the private sphere) in which to
protect against disclosures.
In sum, disclosure protections are justified not only because
private information will lead to judging out of context, but also
because of the value of preserving partial control over how people are
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judged and enabling some limited degree of freedom from the harsh
and often unfair judgments that everyone regularly encounters in
public. Because the disclosure of private information will not
necessarily result in more accurate judgments, the benefits of
disclosure protections can often outweigh the costs.
2. The Trouble with Irrational—and Rational—Judgment.
Besides judging based on partial information, people are also prone
to making irrational judgments. Certain traits and conditions carry
great stigma, which is often the result of incorrect assumptions and
faulty knowledge. According to Goffman, stigma is “an attribute that
303
is deeply discrediting.” Certain stigmatic facts about a person
include addiction, alcoholism, suicide attempts, mental disorders,
unemployment, and illiteracy. Society does not fully accept people
with stigma; they are not treated equally.304 Stigma can spread to
family members, as when children feel stigmatized by a parent’s
criminal past.305 Although there are instances in which stigma is
properly attached to certain conditions, in other cases, it impedes
accurate judgment.
People protect certain secrets because disclosure might lead to
irrational behavior, such as stereotyping and discrimination, toward
them and their families. For much of history, there were widespread
beliefs that people who contracted particular diseases did so because
306
of their character flaws. Even education has a difficult time
cleansing stigma. During the cholera epidemic of 1866, when cholera
was understood to derive from poor sanitation, people still clung to
the belief that the disease was “the scourge of the sinful.”307 People
with noninfectious illnesses, such as cancer, still find themselves
308
shunned by friends and family. Susan Sontag contends:
Nothing is more punitive than to give a disease meaning—that
meaning being invariably a moralistic one. Any important disease
whose causality is murky, and for which treatment is ineffectual,
tends to be awash in significance. First, the subjects of deepest dread

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

GOFFMAN, supra note 300, at 3.
Id. at 7–9.
Id. at 30.
SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 38 (1978).
SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 143 (1990).
SONTAG, supra note 306, at 6.
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(corruption, decay, pollution, anomie, weakness) are identified with
309
the disease. The disease itself becomes a metaphor.

Furthermore, the disclosure that people have certain diseases
engender assumptions about them. Disclosure that a person has
AIDS often results in speculation that a person has engaged in drug
310
use, promiscuous sex, or homosexual sex.
Posner and Epstein believe that the market will correct for such
311
irrationalities in judging. Irrational judgment has opportunity costs
because shunned people may be good workers and can be hired for
below-average wages. Thus, in “a competitive society, irrational
shunning will be weeded out over time.”312
However, this theoretical prediction does not match the current
reality. Several surveys reveal that many employers have incorrect
views of cancer’s effects and treatment, and cancer patients lose their
313
jobs five times more frequently than employees without cancer.
Further, employers can often discriminate without feeling significant
repercussions. If only a small percentage of workers have the
particular stigmatic condition, then there will be little market
incentive not to behave irrationally. Unless such employers are forced
out of business or the economic consequences are severe,
discrimination is likely to continue. Additionally, irrational judgments
have existed throughout human history and continue to exist. Even in
the face of high costs, employers continue to engage in irrational
racial and other forms of discrimination. Market pressure cannot
always rectify strongly held beliefs or subconscious prejudices.314
Even if the market could correct all irrational judgments, many
socially undesirable judgments about others based on private
information are rational. As Julie Cohen notes, judging others out of
315
context is often “the logical product of rational self-interest.”
Genetic discrimination in the workplace can be a rational decision,
309. Id. at 58.
310. Karas, supra note 270, at 427.
311. POSNER, supra note 275, at 235; Epstein, supra note 30, at 18 (“Employers have no
incentive to discriminate against workers whose genetic conditions do not impose any cost,
present or future, against them.”).
312. POSNER, supra note 275, at 235.
313. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 29.
314. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995) (reviewing marketbased theories of racial discrimination).
315. Cohen, supra note 141, at 2033.

SOLOVE.DOC

2003]

07/07/04 1:38 PM

THE VIRTUES OF KNOWING LESS

1043

for an employee with a genetic predisposition for certain diseases will
316
be at greater risk to become unproductive in the future. Even if
employers might rationally decide not to hire a worker based on
genetic information, society might want to restrict employers from
making such decisions. One reason, as Pauline Kim notes, is that such
decisions implicate personal autonomy.
Work in our society represents more than merely an income stream;
it is closely tied to identity, status and community. Foreclosing a
substantial number of employment opportunities not only limits
individuals’ potential earning power, it also deprives them of critical
317
choices through which one creates an identity and builds a life.

There is a lot of information—such as an employee’s off-hours
activities—to which society does not believe employers should be
318
entitled, even when relevant to employee productivity.
Ultimately, decisions about what information is appropriate to
disclose turn on how that information will be used. Society must
weigh the value of the use of the information against the costs.
Evaluating the use of the data requires analyzing its tendency to
produce accurate judgments and, when the potential for accuracy
exists, analyzing whether the types of judgments in question are
desirable to society. Not all accurate judgments are desirable. For
example, the disclosure that a person has AIDS might enable
employers to make a rational decision that the person will be less
productive than an equally qualified healthy employee. But, for many
reasons, society may not want the employer to have the information
to make such a decision. The same piece of information could enable
a prospective spouse or lover to avoid having unprotected sex with
the person. Most people would view this use of the information as
more appropriate.

316. As Pauline Kim argues:
[T]he analogy between genetic discrimination, and race and sex discrimination, is
fundamentally flawed. . . . In the employment context, race and sex discrimination are
believed to be wrong because those characteristics are irrelevant to a worker’s ability
to perform the job. However, genetic technologies offer the potential to provide
information that is arguably relevant to an employee’s future job performance.
Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a
Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1500 (2002).
317. Id. at 1535–36.
318. Id. at 1538.
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3. Gossip and Judgments About Human Nature. Many
disclosures about a person’s private life are not made to those who
have any particular need to judge that person. For example, a news
story may disclose that John Doe has an unusual disease. Most
readers will not know John Doe; and many people that do know him
may not care enough to judge him at all. Under the judgment and
trust critique as discussed thus far, the value of the disclosure to the
public would be rather low if it does not help anybody make better
judgments about John Doe.
Beyond making judgments about particular people, the judgment
and trust critique also contends that disclosure of private information is
important for making judgments about society in general. As Diane
Zimmerman argues: “[G]ossip is a basic form of information exchange
that teaches about other lifestyles and attitudes, and through which
319
community values are changed or reinforced.” She also contends that
the tort of public disclosure should be abolished because “society has
a powerful countervailing interest in exchanges of accurate
information about the private lives and characters of its citizenry.”320
According to this argument, the value of disclosure is its
educational benefits. Revealing private details about people can be
highly instructive. For example, the exposure of people’s sexual lives in
the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s was liberating to many,
and through the greater disclosure of sexual practices, social norms
changed. Privacy can inhibit the development of norms because it hides
certain conduct and activities from public view, allowing society to
avoid confronting them. In Zimmerman’s words, “the exchange of
information is crucial to the cohesiveness of the community and to the
321
full development of all its members.”
However, much of the time, the purpose and function of gossip is
not to educate, but to entertain, to thrill, and to satisfy idle curiosity.
As Warren and Brandeis write: “Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus
harvested, becomes the seed of more. . . . [Gossip] both belittles and
perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things. . . .
When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, [it] crowds the
322
space available for matters of real interest to the community.” Thus,

319. Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 334.
320. Id. at 341.
321. Zimmerman, supra note 256, at 829.
322. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 196.
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gossip comes at a price: It detracts from other matters that may be
more important.
Although in the abstract gossip can educate people about
lifestyles and attitudes, this claim seems somewhat overblown. What
precisely is the educative value of a celebrity’s sex life, drug use, or
dating history? True, these celebrities may become spokespeople for
particular causes, but they often do so at their own initiative. Does
society really need to thrust people into such a role when so many
others seem willing to do so voluntarily? There are countless people
willing to participate in reality television, or to go on talk shows and
speak on virtually everything about their lives. With so many willing
volunteers, what is the marginal value of adding the unwilling to the
ranks?
Despite the fact that people may be curious about the private
lives of others, they routinely recognize that curiosity should be
limited. One may want to read the diary of a spouse or friend, but
may restrain herself from doing so. This is because of certain social
323
norms of restraint. Satisfying one’s curiosity is not an absolute
value. In other words, just because people are curious does not mean
that they should be entitled to have information. Not all itches ought
to be scratched.
With regard to private figures, the educative function of gossip
could readily be satisfied without revealing the identities of the
individuals involved. Returning to the example of John Doe’s unusual
disease, most people watching or reading the news do not care about
Doe’s identity. The story is interesting because of the particular
disease, not because of who Doe is. As I discussed in Part I, privacy
law should move beyond abstractions and focus on particular uses. If
the disclosure is helpful because it educates people about human
nature (rather than improves judgments about individuals whom
people already know), then revealing the identity of a person often is
unnecessary.
One might reply that if the disclosure does not lead anybody to
judge Doe differently, then what is the harm to Doe in revealing his
identity? The harm is that people often feel as though they are being
judged. When personal information about someone is leaked, that
person may constantly wonder whether particular people know about
it and how the information might change people’s perceptions. This
323. See Post, supra note 33, at 957 (arguing that the common law tort of invasion of privacy
safeguards social norms, which he calls “rules of civility”).
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can create a significant sense of unease. The fear of being judged can
be even more harmful than actually being judged. It can interfere
with one’s life in a profound way. Even if people are judged more
favorably than they might fear, they still must live wondering what
others really think of them. Protecting against disclosure prevents this
type of harm.
Thus far, I have discussed instances in which gossip fails to
provide much value. Although I believe that Zimmerman’s gossip
argument overreaches in its assessment of gossip’s value, there are
indeed many instances when gossip can be educative and when
disclosure of a person’s private information helps to change certain
social norms. This argument is frequently raised in support of the
324
outing of gays. Outing gays, the argument goes, will help alter
society’s perception of gays by demonstrating that mainstream people
or role models are gay. According to Jean Cohen, many scholars
argue that privacy is more harmful than helpful to gays because the
325
“closet” becomes a prison, a shameful place where gays should hide.
Cohen aptly responds that there is a difference between privacy that
is forced upon a person and privacy that is chosen.326 Anita Allen also
recognizes this distinction: “[C]oercive collective authority is properly
marshaled both to protect ‘wanted’ privacy from the ‘unwanted gaze’
and to protect ‘unwanted’ privacy from the ‘wanted gaze.’ Privacy
327
could, in effect, be imposed on the unwilling or uninterested.”
According to Allen, the question of when privacy should be imposed
or should be a matter of choice is a difficult one, and it must be
328
analyzed based on the need for overriding individual choice.
Paul Schwartz is correct to criticize what he calls “over-zealous
norm entrepreneurs” who seek to change social norms by releasing
329
personal information about others. Schwartz demonstrates that the
social costs of such efforts to change these norms often outweigh the

324. See, e.g., Kathleen Guzman, About Outing: Public Discourse, Private Lives, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1531, 1568 (1995) (“Outers offer up the victim as a ‘sacrificial lamb’ to portray
themselves as purifying redeemers, able to solve the problems of discrimination.”).
325. Jean L. Cohen, Is Privacy a Legal Duty?, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: LEGAL, POLITICAL,
AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 117, 122–24 (Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves & Ursula
Vogel eds., 2000).
326. Id. at 125.
327. Anita L. Allen, The Wanted Gaze: Accountability for Interpersonal Conduct at Work,
89 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2015 (2001).
328. Id. at 2017–18.
329. Schwartz, supra note 209, at 843.
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benefits. Norm entrepreneurs who disclose personal data about
others create social costs, fostering an atmosphere of coercion,
330
blackmail, and witch hunts. Ironically, norm entrepreneurs may
increase the oppressiveness of the norms they seek to displace, and
they can expose information that increases the power of the state.331
It is true that if the veils on people’s lives were all removed
simultaneously, society might collectively discard certain norms.
However, the process of changing norms is complicated, and it is far
from certain that massive disclosure would effectuate a change in
332
norms. Further, in reality disclosure is haphazard, so the number of
people subject to disclosure will rarely be enough to force a change
in norms.
Human judgment is a profoundly important yet destructive
activity. Although judging others is essential to basic social
relationships, judgments can be hasty, distorted, irrational, and
undesirable. They can cause immeasurable harm. The law certainly
cannot stop people from judging each other, but it can help people
control some of the information that might be used to make
judgments about them.
4. Problems with Regulating Judgment.
a. The Problem of Paternalism. Some might counter that people
are entitled to make their own assessments of others in the manner of
their choosing even if many would find their judgments irrational.
Volokh argues that “in a free speech regime, others’ definitions of me
should primarily be molded by their own judgments, rather than by
333
my using legal coercion to keep them in the dark.” In other words,
privacy is paternalistic. It denies people information because it
distrusts them to make informed choices. If people desire to make
bad judgments about others based on partial information, it is their
prerogative. What business does the law have in telling people how
they should judge other people?

330. Id. at 842–43.
331. Id. at 843.
332. See Elwood, supra note 254, at 773 (“Even under the best of circumstances, the
relationship between outing a particular figure and effecting a societal change is simply too
attenuated to override the outing target’s privacy rights.”).
333. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1093.
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Certainly, the fact that some people may consider personal
information relevant to their decisions cannot be ignored. Society
must weigh the value of disclosure against the distorting effects it
might have, as well as against its other negative social effects.
Although the fact that the legal system must conduct this balancing
may not be ideal, this is the way that many issues of fundamental
importance to our society are determined, such as equal protection,
due process, and freedom of association. At some point, the value of
true information is outweighed by other concerns.
Once again, evidence law provides a good example. At trials,
courts routinely restrict the introduction of certain information to
juries who must make very important decisions, often with profound
implications for the safety of society (for example, whether to convict
a serial killer or terrorist). Even relevant evidence can be excluded
334
from a trial because it is more prejudicial than probative. Although
certain information can be very helpful in assessing another person,
and more information can often be preferable, with certain types of
information, society knows that judgments are not always fair and
recognizes that keeping such information private will not impede fair
judgment.”335
Failing to police the disclosure of personal information does
more than just interfere with people’s private autonomy and
independence—it has larger effects on participation in the public
sphere. As many commentators have pointed out, the bright spotlight
of the media can deter capable people from seeking public office or
336
speaking publicly about important issues. It can limit the public
sphere to a particular type of individual—one who enjoys letting it all
hang out, who loves the spotlight. It can deter all those who have
engaged in some deviant activity or who have a few eccentricities.
This has the result of de-democratizing the public sphere to a select
group of individuals, and it impairs the opportunity to engage in
334. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.”).
335. See Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 178 (1999)
(discussing Oscar Wilde’s concealment of his homosexuality to avoid the “derogatory meanings
others in his society brought to their understandings of homosexuality”).
336. See, e.g., Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 743, 746 (1986); Richard Davis, Supreme Court Nominations and the News Media, 57 ALB.
L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1994); Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71
WASH. L. REV. 683, 710 (1996).
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public life. Another result is that the public sphere itself is diminished
because it becomes filled with certain personality types who do not
mind radical publicity of their faults, who live bland and uninteresting
lives, or who enjoy the risk of public discovery. As Thomas Nagel
argues, there is a great harm caused by the fact that the public “feels
entitled to know the most intimate details of the life of any public
337
figure.” The harm is that the public sphere is damaged because
“[m]any people cannot take that kind of exposure.”338
Disclosure protections should not simply be dismissed as
paternalistic impositions on social judgment. Such paternalism may be
self-imposed by a society through norms of restraint. Legal
protections of privacy often emerge from community norms. As
Robert Post observes, privacy “safeguards rules of civility that in
some significant measure constitute both individuals and
339
community.” Of course, one might argue that the rights of
individuals to do what they want should trump the interests of society
as a whole. I contend that when it is socially beneficial to protect
individual autonomy, the law should do so. Individual rights, though,
should not be viewed as trumps; as John Dewey aptly argues, rights
should be understood instrumentally in light of “the contribution they
make to the welfare of the community.”340 There are many instances
in which society has strong interests in telling people how to judge
others, and these interests can outweigh individual autonomy in
judging others. For example, few people would object to society’s
restricting judgments based on racial bias.
An apt analogy can be made to Ulysses and the Sirens:
[Sirens] weaving a haunting song over the sea
we are to shun, she said, and their green shore
all sweet with clover; yet she urged that I
alone should listen to their song. Therefore
you are to tie me up, tight as a splint,
erect upon the mast, lashed to the mast,
and if I shout and beg to be untied,
341
take more turns of the rope to muffle me.
337. THOMAS NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE & OTHER ESSAYS 3 (2002).
338. Id.
339. Post, supra note 33, at 959.
340. JOHN DEWEY, Liberalism and Civil Liberties, SOCIAL FRONTIER 2, Feb. 1936, at 137,
reprinted in 11 THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, supra note 135, at 373.
341. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. XII, ll. 190–98, at 214 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Vintage
Books 1990).
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Ulysses desires to be self-restrained; he wants to be tied up because
he knows that he might not be able to control himself. Similarly,
people may recognize the value of being restrained from learning
certain details about others, even if they crave gossip and would gain
much pleasure from hearing it. Curiosity is an important desire, for it
leads to our quest for knowledge. But it can also be harmful, and
society has norms about the appropriate level of gossip. Privacy
protections represent society tying itself to the mast. This is not an
external paternalistic restriction, but one that is internal and selfimposed.
Indeed, the First Amendment is also a vehicle for society to
restrain itself. The First Amendment prevents a society from passing
laws that infringe upon free speech. Ironically, the self-restraint of the
First Amendment often clashes with the self-restraint of privacy
342
protections. In this way, the First Amendment is paternalistic, for it
restrains society from passing many laws and regulations that it
desires to enact. Disclosure protections indirectly restrain individuals
from judging based on certain information, by restricting the public
disclosure of that information. Although the First Amendment
restrains government, whereas disclosure protections restrain
individuals, both doctrines exercise restraint to achieve similar
goalspromoting autonomy and democratic self-governance. For
some of the very same reasons that society cherishes the restraints of
the First Amendment, it should also cherish the restraints of privacy
protections. In short, there is no escape from paternalism. Both free
speech and privacy are paternalistic, just in different ways. Therefore,
the issue becomes what kinds of paternalism society wants and for
what purposes.
b. Dissonance and Deception. Although it is hard to dispute that
the self is complicated and that everyone plays different roles in
different contexts, this does not necessarily imply that the law should
actively promote role-playing. Indeed, people would be
uncomfortable around those who were too chameleon-like, radically
changing their personalities in every situation. Maybe less dissonance
between people’s different roles would produce more well-adjusted
individuals, better able to reconcile the different aspects of their lives.
Perhaps privacy is bad for the self.
342. I contend that neither form of social self-restraint is absolute, and, therefore, when
there is conflict, a balancing must take place.
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Although less dissonance between public and private roles might
seem desirable initially, such dissonance need not be problematic. Of
course, too much dissonance may be troublesome, and the
appropriate degree of dissonance for mental and emotional wellbeing is a question that psychiatrists are best equipped to answer. The
paternalism argument, as applied to this issue, could cut in favor of
privacy protections. It would be paternalistic for the law to fail to
respect the choices that individuals make regarding the degree of
dissonance tolerable in their public and private lives. The law should
protect people’s choices in this area, as these choices further
individual autonomy. Of course, because autonomy is not absolute, it
is important to consider community norms. As Thomas Nagel
observes: “One might well ask how it is that we can remain on good
terms with others when we know that behind their polite exteriors
they harbor feelings and opinions that we would find unacceptable if
they were expressed publicly.”343 Society has come to accept the fact
that there is dissonance between public and private selves. For
example, people not only accept the telling of white lies, but even
deem them necessary in many contexts. As Nagel further observes:
“One of the remarkable effects of a smoothly fitting public surface is
that it protects one from the sense of exposure without having to be in
any way dishonest or deceptive, just as clothing does not conceal the
fact that one is naked underneath.”344
Nagel’s observations suggest a key pointsociety recognizes and
accepts the fact that the public self is a partly fictional construct. The
public self is constructed according to social norms about what is
appropriate to expose in public. Notably, people may even feel
uncomfortable when other people reveal too many personal details
about themselves. For example, if a person describes in detail her
medical and psychological conditions, many people consider this “too
much information,” which may make social situations uneasy. Movies
and literature abound with awkward situations of too much personal
information in public, such as a couple laying bare intimate details
about their relationship, or a person disclosing another’s deep secrets,
or a friend revealing another’s sexual exploits. Generalizing from this
very complex set of norms, society expects the public self to be more
buttoned-up than the private self.

343.
344.

NAGEL, supra note 337, at 7.
Id.
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Of course, dissonance can go too far. With too much dissonance,
people may begin to feel deceived by another person. Dissonance is
not deception, although the line between them is not a sharp one. But
the lack of a clear line does not mean that there is no distinction
between dissonance and deception. The terms merely denote a
boundary between what people perceive as acceptable fictions and
unacceptable ones. As Goffman notes, people will view someone as
an impostor or fraud when they believe that the person is not
345
“authorized to give the performance in question.” There are many
346
“shadings between lies and truths.” Because people play many
roles, “there is often no reason for claiming that the facts discrepant
with the fostered impression are any more the real reality than is the
fostered reality they embarrass.”347 What is acceptable versus what is
out of bounds depends upon social norms, which are complex and
subtle enough to recognize that people do play discrepant roles.
Another difficulty with protecting against disclosures is that such
protections, even if justified as protecting a socially acceptable degree
of dissonance, may in practice promote deception. Sometimes, people
wear masks to hide who they are. For example, politicians may
masquerade as impeccable moral leaders when in fact they commit
the very sins against which they preach. I am certainly not arguing
that because the self plays many roles, there is no deception or
duplicity. People lie about themselves all the time. Sometimes these
lies are trivial; but other times these lies are quite important, and
disclosure protections can prevent the revelation of information that
might desirably expose these falsehoods. However, as Anita Allen
correctly contends, lying should not be viewed as a “categorical moral
wrong.”348 In particular, Allen argues that sometimes deception is
349
justified to protect sexual privacyeven for public figures. For
Allen, sexual privacy can outweigh the value of truth. She illustrates
her argument by discussing Oscar Wilde’s concealment of his
homosexuality.350 According to Allen, Wilde was justified in lying:

345. GOFFMAN, supra note 292, at 59.
346. Id. at 62.
347. Id. at 65.
348. Allen, supra note 335, at 161.
349. Id. at 161–63; see also Allen, supra note 194, at 1167 (balancing the value of exposing
the sexual misconduct of public figures against the value of protecting their privacy).
350. Id. at 178–79.
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Wilde lied because he was unable through force of character and art
to persuade an entire society of what he thought was the true nature
and significance of his relationships with men, and unable to get his
wife, the world or Queensberry to see these relationships’ true
351
meaning and his true identity.

The fact that deception can and does occur does not mean that
all disclosures are socially beneficial. Still, many disclosures are.
Although it is impossible to create easy rules, this does not mean that
society must abandon efforts to protect against disclosures. Some
information is more distorting and unhelpful in particular contexts.
The key point is that information cannot be detached from its uses.
Information is relevant to certain inquiries, but not to others. Often,
discussions about privacy focus on the information alone. But
information must be linked to its uses, for this is the best way to assess
whether to protect against disclosures.
It is hard to ever say that a particular piece of information is
always helpful or harmful, relevant or irrelevant. The debate over
disclosures often fails to focus on uses, and it is hard to reach a
meaningful balance between privacy and disclosure without such a
focus. Disclosure is often seen as all or nothing; if disclosure is
justified, it must be justified for everyone in every context. By
understanding disclosure to involve levels of access to information
based on the information’s uses, it becomes possible to modulate
when disclosures are appropriate. We should not ask: Can this
information be disclosed? Instead, the better question is: In this
context, should the information be disclosed for this use?
B. Concealing the Past: Growth and Reformation
The discussion in the preceding Section suggests that in cases in
which information will not lead to more accurate judgments the law
should restrict disclosure. But in many instances, accuracy is increased
by disclosure. In these cases, it can still be justifiable to restrict
disclosure when the increase in accuracy is outweighed by the values
promoted by protecting privacy.
One of the values of protecting privacy is facilitating growth and
reformation. The self is not fixed, but grows throughout an entire
352
lifetime. At any given moment, the self is merely a snapshot.

351.
352.

Id.
See DEWEY, supra note 67, at 210.
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According to John Dewey, the individual is not “something complete,
perfect, finished, an organized whole of parts united by the impress of
a comprehensive form,” but is “something moving, changing, discrete,
353
and above all initiating instead of final.” A person is a life process
from cradle to corpse. At any given moment, we are seeing just a
snapshot in time, a slice of this lifelong process. Playwright and author
Friedrich Dhrrenmatt put it eloquently:
[W]hat one commonly called one’s self was merely a collective term
for all the selves gathered up in the past, a great heap of selves
perpetually growing under the constant rain of selves drifting down
through the present from the future, an accumulation of shreds of
experience and memory, comparable to a mound of leaves that
grows higher and higher under a steady drift of other falling leaves. .
354
..

Most people have embarrassing moments in their past. Everyone
has done things and regretted them later. In childhood, they may have
acted with great immaturity, done cruel things to others, or done
things that make them ashamed. There is a great value in allowing
individuals the opportunity to wipe the slate clean. Society protects
against such disclosures not just to protect the individual, but to
further society’s interest in providing people with incentives and room
to change and grow. Of course, people should not always be able to
escape disclosure of their past conduct, for one’s past partly defines
who one is. However, the past is not wholly determinative.
Protection against disclosure permits room to change, to define
oneself and one’s future without becoming a “prisoner of [one’s]
355
recorded past.” Society has a tendency to tie people too tightly to
the past and to typecast people in particular roles. The human
353. Id. at 167; see also JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 97 (Jo Ann
Boydston ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1988) (discussing “the difference between a self taken as
something already made and a self still making through action”). As psychologist Carl
Schneider notes, protection against disclosure is similar to the skin of a fruit or the shell of an
egg. CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY 37 (1992); see also David L.
Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587, 590 (1977) (“[P]rivacy shelters the emerging
individual’s thoughts from public disclosure and control so that the fear of being watched,
exposed, ridiculed, or penalized does not crush the seeds of independent thinking before they
can mature.”).
354. FRIEDRICH DhRRENMATT, THE ASSIGNMENT 24 (Joel Agee trans., Random House
1988).
355. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB NO. (05) 73–94, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS (1973), at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm.
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personality is dynamic, yet it is frequently difficult to accept the
complete implications of this fact. Disclosure can lead to the creation
of a permanent record about people, baggage that they must
constantly carry around and explain. For example, a thirty-four-yearold professional named Michael wrote a few articles in specialized
356
journals while briefly in prison when he was a juvenile. Michael
never imagined the rise of Google, a search engine that can comb the
Internet for every article mentioning a person’s name. When Michael
dates, women ask him about his stint in prison:
“When you meet someone,” Michael says, “you don’t say, ‘I had an
affair one time,’ or ‘I was arrested for DUI once,’ or ‘I cheated on
my taxes in 1984.’” Since then, there have been other
confrontations, but what Michael finds most disturbing are the
sudden silences. “Instead of thinking, ‘Was I curt last week?’ or
“Did I insult this political party or that belief?’ I have to think about
357
what happened when I was 17.”

In one instance, Michael was interviewed several times for a job
when, suddenly, the potential employer began ignoring him:
“[Michael’s] hunch: Someone Googled him. But the worst part is,
358
he’ll never know.”
When personal information is disclosed in today’s age, it is
routinely archived and often becomes instantly available. Michael’s
problem is not that he is embarrassed by his past or wants to escape
from it. Rather, he dislikes having to constantly justify himself and
explain away his past baggage. Worse still, he is rarely afforded the
opportunity to explain.
Of course, it may be rational for people to shun those with
problems in their pasts. Much depends upon whether people who
have exhibited troubled behavior in the past are more likely to exhibit
similar behavior in the future than are those without such histories.
However, even if people with troubled pasts are more of a risk to
befriend, trust, or employ, there remain social benefits to providing
them with the freedom to change and grow.

356. Neil Swidey, A Nation of Voyeurs: How the Internet Search Engine Google Is Changing
What We Can Find Out About Each Other and Raising Questions About Whether We Should,
BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Feb. 2, 2003, at 10.
357. Id.
358. Id.; see also Jennifer 8. Lee, Trying to Elude the Google Grasp, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2002, at G1 (“[T]he combined power of the Internet, search engines and archival databases can
enable almost anyone to find information about almost anyone else. . . .”).
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The great difficulty is in how to deal with the concealment of
criminal pasts. This information can be highly relevant for whether
people trust a person, especially when a person with a history of
violent criminal conduct has contact with children. Many people with
such histories are not rehabilitated and are at high risk to commit
359
future crimes. On the other hand, there is an important social value
in providing people with the opportunity to reform their lives. For
example, in Melvin v. Reid,360 a former prostitute had left the business
long previously and had established a new life. A film, entitled “The
Red Kimono,” depicted her life story and used her maiden name. She
sued under the tort of public disclosure. The court held that, although
the story of her life could be disclosed, there was no need to use her
real name. The court noted that a central objective of society was the
“rehabilitation of the fallen and the reformation of the criminal.”361
“Where a person has by his own efforts rehabilitated himself,” the
court observed, “we, as right-thinking members of society, should
permit him to continue in the path of rectitude rather than throw him
back into a life of shame or crime.”362
The question of when to permit people to conceal their criminal
pasts cannot be decided categorically. If society is committed to
rehabilitation, then it must genuinely provide people with an
opportunity to reform themselves. Such an opportunity can be
impeded by stigma and shunning that can result from disclosure.
Protections can restrict the instances of disclosure of criminal pasts to
when such information is most relevant and socially beneficial for
others to know.
But why should rehabilitation outweigh the social value of
knowing about another’s sordid past? As noted already, people may
rationally conclude that it is better not to risk trusting people with a
criminal past. There are plenty of other people worth trusting.
Recidivism rates are quite high. Many ex-convicts do commit crimes
again. Sex offenders do reoffend. Why not let people make up their
own minds? Does rehabilitation outweigh society’s interest in

359. See generally T. Markus Funk, The Dangers of Hiding Criminal Pasts, 66 TENN. L.
REV. 287 (1998) (arguing that expunging certain juvenile crimes from a person’s record is a
mistake).
360. 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931).
361. Id. at 93.
362. Id.
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allowing people to make accurate judgments about individuals who
committed crimes in the past?
Rehabilitation is valuable, and the United States has a long
tradition of acknowledging the possibility of rehabilitation. Indeed,
some of this country’s colonial settlers were convicted criminals,
363
transported here for their crimes. As Lawrence Friedman observes:
American society is and has been a society of extreme mobility, in
every sense of the word: social, economic, geographical. Mobility
has meant freedom; mobility has been an American value. People
often moved from place to place; they shed an old life like a snake
molting its skin. They took on new lives and new identities. They
went from rags to riches, from log cabins to the White House.
American culture and law put enormous emphasis on
364
second chances.

Society’s commitment to providing people opportunities to
change is illustrated by the fact that most states have laws that
expunge juvenile criminal records when the juvenile reaches
365
adulthood. As one court observed, “an unexpunged juvenile record
may create a lifelong handicap because of the stigma it carries.”366
One could counter that rehabilitation is an American myth; the
rehabilitated criminal that is chronicled in literature and the movies is
an idealized hero, not a realistic figure. However, despite the
difficulties with rehabilitation, it still remains a deep-rooted tradition.
Our criminal justice system engages in frequent and extensive efforts
to rehabilitate, such as prison education programs and boot camps.
The benefits of rehabilitation are difficult to reject, especially in a
criminal justice system from which most criminals are released back
into society. Perhaps under different conditions, rehabilitation could
be more readily abandoned. But the very structure of our penal
system makes the goal of rehabilitation an important one that cannot
be ignored.

363. Sarah Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles
of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 756–57 (1996).
364. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in
Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1112 (2002).
365. See Funk, supra note 359, at 288 (suggesting that state laws permitting the expunging of
juvenile criminal records are “grounded on a belief that juveniles will outgrow their reckless
youthful behavior”).
366. People v. Price, 431 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
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This rather abstract discussion can be assisted by some examples.
A very difficult case involving the disclosure of a person’s criminal
367
past is Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n. In Briscoe, a magazine
article disclosed the fact that the plaintiff had once hijacked a truck.
The crime had occurred eleven years previously, and Briscoe had
established a new life. His friends, family, and young daughter were
not aware of his criminal past.368 The court held that, although
Briscoe’s crime was newsworthy, he could sue for the use of his name,
369
which was not relevant to the article. The court reasoned:
One of the premises of the rehabilitative process is that the
rehabilitated offender can rejoin that great bulk of the community
from which he has been ostracized for his anti-social acts. In return
for becoming a ‘new man,’ he is allowed to melt into the shadows
370
of obscurity.

On the Briscoe case, Volokh argues: “While criminals can change
their character . . . they often don’t. Someone who was willing to fight
a gun battle with the police eleven years ago may be more willing
than the average person to do something bad today, even if he has led
371
a blameless life since then.” Although the information about
Briscoe “may have little to do with broad political debates,” it is of
“legitimate public concern” for “people who know Briscoe, the very
same group whose ignorance Briscoe seemed most concerned about
preserving.”372
However, the article was not written for the purpose of informing
people who knew Briscoe about his past. Volokh’s argument focuses
on information about ex-convicts in the abstract. In Briscoe, the
article had nothing to do with Briscoe. This was not a disclosure to
Briscoe’s friends or family by a person concerned about their safety.
Rather, it was a disclosure of Briscoe’s identity in connection with an
article about hijacking. There was no need to identify Briscoe in order
to tell the story. As I have argued throughout this Article, the law
should not evaluate a disclosure without considering context.
The value of rehabilitation is not absolute. The balancing
approach that I recommend requires weighing the value of
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
Id. at 36.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 41.
Volokh, supra note 32, at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
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rehabilitation against the value of the use of the information in the
context in which it is disclosed. Focusing on the information in the
abstract—for any possible use—will invariably reveal a set of
circumstances or a particular use valuable enough to justify a
disclosure. Critics of disclosure restrictions often point to these
instances. However, although these critics may prove that privacy
sometimes is outweighed by the need for disclosure, they do not
demonstrate that disclosure is justifiable under all circumstances.
As I discussed earlier, it is best to avoid dissociating information
from its uses. To balance rehabilitation against the benefits of
disclosure, one must look to the uses of information that the
disclosure serves. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) restricts the disclosure of criminal history information over
373
seven years old on a credit report in some contexts. The FCRA
represents a judgment that one’s prior criminal history becomes stale
and not relevant for the purposes of credit after a period of years. The
balance that FCRA strikes must be understood not in the abstract,
but in terms of the information’s relevance to how credit reporting
agencies are using it. Criminal history information has some relevance
to assessing creditworthiness, but it is not highly relevant.
Perhaps one of the most difficult issues involves Megan’s Laws,
which establish public databases containing various personal
information about sexual offenders, such as their photographs,
374
addresses, prior convictions, and places of employment. Megan’s
Laws exist in all fifty states, many created in response to Congress’s
375
A number of states post Megan’s Law
1996 Megan’s Law.
information on the Internet.
In support of Megan’s Law, it is hard to argue that the safety of
children does not outweigh the rehabilitative benefits and the
dignitary harms to sex offenders. Supporters of Megan’s Law point to
376
high recidivism rates for sexual offenders. However, there are
373. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5) (2000).
374. Megan’s Laws are named after Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl in New Jersey who
was raped and murdered by a neighbor with two earlier sexual assault convictions. DANIEL J.
SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 391 (2003).
375. See Megan’s Law § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 14,071(e) (2000) (authorizing states to release
relevant information about persons required to register under the Act when “necessary to
protect the public.”).
376. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 374 (N.J. 1995) (“[S]uccessful treatment of sex
offenders appears to be rare.”); Daniel L. Feldman, The “Scarlet Letter Laws” of the 1990s: A
Response to Critics, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1104–05 (1997) (“Megan’s Law provides some degree
of additional protection for communities against . . . sex offenders, who tend, as a group, to have
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reasons to doubt the underlying assumptions in this balancing. There
is little proof that Megan’s Law disclosures protect the safety of
children. Of course, there is also not much proof that Megan’s Laws
fail. What is better documented is that when the identities of sexual
offenders are revealed through Megan’s Law disclosures, these
people can be harassed and threatened. There are numerous cases of
377
attempts at vigilante justice and violence against the sex offenders.
They may lose their jobs and be ostracized. This may increase the
likelihood that sexual offenders will commit new crimes.
Additionally, in certain cases, a Megan’s Law can sweep too broadly.
Some Megan’s Laws include a wide range of offenses, such as
sodomy, prostitution, consensual homosexual acts, and masturbation
in public.378 The disclosures under Megan’s Laws sometimes do not
reveal whether the offender was convicted for a relatively minor
crime, such as consensual sodomy, or a more serious and violent one,
such as rape. Pedophiles are sometimes classified the same as high
school students convicted of statutory rape by having sex with their
underage girlfriends or boyfriends.379
Another difficulty with Megan’s Laws is that most sexual
offenses against children are committed by family members or close
380
family friends92 percent under one estimate. Often, not just the
offenders feel embarrassment and stigma when their status as sex
offenders is disclosedso do members of their families. Ironically,
Megan’s Laws may stigmatize the very victims of sex offenses whom
they are designed to protect, many of whom are children living in the
same house as the sex offender.

unusually high rates of recidivism.”); Susan Deschler Oakes, Megan’s Law: Analysis on Whether
It Is Constitutional to Notify the Public of Sex Offenders Via the Internet, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1133, 1134 (1999) (“Sex offenders are nine times more likely to repeat
their crimes than any other class of criminals.”).
377. See Stacey Hiller, Note, The Problem with Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The
Detrimental Effects of Public Disclosure, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 286 (1998) (describing
incidents of violence against sex offenders whose names had been made public).
378. See Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood?: Due Process,
Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1451, 1456 (1999)
(listing offenses that fall within the definition of “sex offender”).
379. See Stephanie Simon, Ex-Cons Exiled to Outskirts: Iowa Sex Offenders, Forbidden to
Live Within 2,000 Feet of Schools and Child Care Centers, Must Crowd Into Pockets of Desolate
Housing, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at A1 (describing the law in Iowa).
380. Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, Comment, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The
Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter
Laws of the 1990s, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 788, 851–52 (1996).
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I am not prepared to conclude that Megan’s Laws are
categorically undesirable. Megan’s Law disclosures may be relevant
for certain types of relationships, such as child care. Still, most
Megan’s Laws lose sight of the use of the information in question.
Megan’s Law data are beneficial when disclosed for certain purposes,
but not necessarily for all purposes. When placed on the Internet for
any curious individual around the world to see, Megan’s Law
information becomes disconnected from its goals.
381
In New Jersey, in Paul P. v. Farmer, the court made an attempt
to appropriately balance privacy with the benefits of disclosure. To
receive information, the recipient had to sign a form agreeing to share
information only with members of her household and caregivers for
her children. Unfortunately, New Jersey subsequently amended its
Constitution by referendum to place Megan’s Law data on the
382
Internet. In an even more extreme approach, one judge in Texas
ordered sex offenders to post signs in their front yards declaring:
383
“Danger! Registered Sex Offender Lives Here.” The judge also
required them to place bumper stickers on their cars: “Danger!
Registered Sex Offender in Vehicle.”384
If the goal of Megan’s Law is to punish, to return to the shaming
punishments of the colonial era, where people were branded,
385
mutilated, or adorned with scarlet letters, then these approaches
certainly further that goal. But the Supreme Court has held that
punishment is not the purpose of Megan’s Laws. In Smith v. Doe,386
the Supreme Court examined whether Alaska’s Megan’s Law
violated the constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws.387 The
Court noted that if the sex offender registration and notification law
is designed to “impose punishment” then it “constitutes retroactive
punishment” and is an impermissible ex post facto law.388 Moreover,
even if the law is not designed to punish, the law will violate the Ex
381.
382.

80 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2000), aff’d, 227 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2000).
Maria Newman, Naming Sex Offenders on the Internet Passes in New Jersey, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at B16.
383. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 374, at 400.
384. Id.
385. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1913 (1991).
386. 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
387. Pursuant to Article I, section 9 of the U.S. Constitution, “No . . . ex post facto Law shall
be passed” by the federal government. Pursuant to Article I, section 10, “No state shall . . . pass
any . . . ex post facto Law.”
388. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1146–47.
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Post Facto Clause if it is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
389
negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.”
Alaska’s Megan’s Law makes public the following information:
[N]ame, aliases, address, photograph, physical description,
description [,] license [and] identification numbers of motor vehicles,
place of employment, date of birth, crime for which convicted, date
of conviction, place and court of conviction, length and conditions of
sentence, and a statement as to whether the offender or kidnapper is
in compliance with [the update] requirements . . . or cannot
390
be located.

Deferring to the Alaska legislature, the Court concluded that “the
intent of the Alaska Legislature was to create a civil, nonpunitive
391
regime.” Moreover, the effect of the law did not “negate Alaska’s
intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme.”392 The Court
dismissed the argument that Alaska’s Megan’s Law resembles a
shaming punishment:
[T]he stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results not from public
display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of
accurate information about a criminal record, most of which is
already public. Our system does not treat dissemination of truthful
information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as
punishment. . . The publicity may cause adverse consequences for
the convicted defendant, running from mild personal embarrassment
to social ostracism. In contrast to the colonial shaming punishments,
however, the State does not make the publicity and the resulting
393
stigma an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.

The Court reasoned that although the “reach of the Internet is
greater than anything which could have been designed in colonial
times,” the goal of Megan’s Law notification is “to inform the public
for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender . . . . The Internet
makes the document search more efficient, cost effective, and
394
convenient for Alaska’s citizenry.”

389. Id. at 1147 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
390. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1146 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087(b) (Michie 2002))
(second, third, and fourth alterations in original).
391. Id. at 1149.
392. Id. at 1154.
393. Id. at 1150.
394. Id. at 1150–51.
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If, as the Court concluded with respect to Alaska’s law, the
purposes of Megan’s Laws are to protect the safety of the community,
then there are a myriad of less harmful ways to disclose the
information than posting it on the Internet. Additionally, as the
dissent observed, the Alaska law “makes no provision whatever for
the possibility of rehabilitation. . . . However plain it may be that a
former sex offender currently poses no threat of recidivism, he will
remain subject to long-term monitoring and inescapable
395
humiliation.” For example, the dissent discussed the plight of one of
the sex offenders challenging the law. Prior to the enactment of the
law, John Doe I pleaded nolo contendere to a sexual abuse charge.
After successfully finishing a treatment program, he was granted early
release. He remarried, created a business, and was even “granted
custody of a minor daughter, based on a court’s determination that he
had been successfully rehabilitated. The court’s determination rested
in part on psychiatric evaluations concluding that Doe had ‘a very low
risk of re- offending’ and is ‘not a pedophile.’”396
The sweep of Megan’s Laws is often too broad. In a companion
case to Smith, the Court upheld a Connecticut Megan’s Law statute
397
that applies to “all sex offenders—currently dangerous or not.” This
law’s scope seems far more extensive than necessary to achieve the
purpose of protecting community safety.
C. Reassessing the Judgment and Trust Critique
The judgment and trust critique argues that disclosure is more
socially beneficial than privacy protections because personal
information informs people about those around them and about
human nature in general. In contrast to the free speech critique, the
judgment and trust critique does not locate the value of information
in one’s right to speak or in self-governance. Nor does the value of
disclosure lie in entertainment. Rather, the value stems from what
personal information teaches people about others.
This critique must certainly be reckoned with. People need
information to make judgments about others, and these judgments
are important for how they live their lives and whom they trust.
However, as I have argued, this critique goes only so far. In many
instances, people’s judgment is flawed. One often judges others out of
395.
396.
397.

Id. at 1160 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (citations omitted).
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 1164 (2003).
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context. There are judgments that society wants to prevent, such as
irrational judgments and even certain kinds of rational ones. As for
gossip, although some of the time it can educate people about human
nature, often it functions only to entertain. Moreover, the educative
benefits of gossip can often be achieved by people’s voluntary
disclosure of details about their lives. If the purpose of gossip is to
teach us lessons about human nature in general, there is often no
need to identify individuals who desire privacy.
In short, although disclosure certainly can have a substantial
social value, so can privacy. In fact, privacy can improve people’s
judgments about others, or at least prevent certain flaws in the
judging process. Privacy can prevent harms to individuals, as well as
provide people with freedom for self-exploration and room to change,
grow, and rehabilitate themselves. Too much information, as with too
much of almost anything, can be more detrimental than beneficial.
CONCLUSION
The manner in which the law regulates the disclosure of personal
information is of profound importance. Privacy, in the form of
protection against disclosure, regulates the way people relate to
others in society. Among other things, it promotes one’s ability to
engage in social affairs, form friendships and human relationships,
communicate with others, and associate with groups of people sharing
similar values. Social judgment and social norms can impede these
practices. People’s lives in the public sphere are precarious, for they
are constantly subject to the judgment of others and to the sting of
social sanctions. It is because people care so much about their public
lives, about how others in society regard and treat them, that
protection against disclosure is important. Protection against
disclosure opens up ways for people to communicate and associate
with others without destroying or inhibiting our public roles.
Protection against disclosure shields us from the harshness of social
judgment, which, if left unregulated, could become too powerful and
oppressive.
Nevertheless, both the free speech and the judgment and trust
critiques remain quite compelling. Society values free expression and
openness; and people often want to obtain personal information for a
variety of purposes. In this Article, I have argued that in order to
reconcile privacy with the value of communicating information, the
law must steer away from absolutes and abstractions. Existing debates
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over disclosure protections often focus on information in the abstract.
By contrast, I have argued that information must be considered in
context, which means that the relationships in which the information
is transferred and the ways in which it is used become the central
focus of inquiry. Focusing on the context in which disclosures are
made is the only meaningful way to assess the value of a particular
disclosure against the costs. This task is a complex one, but it is worth
the effort. Information flow and privacy are both extremely important
values; finding the right balance will be critical to shaping the future
of a world increasingly driven by information.

